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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Crawford v. Washington,
1
 the Supreme Court remade the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to exclude all testimonial hearsay statements 
made by a declarant whom the defendant had no opportunity to confront 
either before or during trial.
2
  The Court therefore rejected prior law holding 
that confrontation is unnecessary when a declarant‘s statement fits an 
established hearsay exception, or is otherwise shown to be reliable by 
 
* Brendan Moore Professor of Advocacy and Director of Trial Competitions, Fordham 
University School of Law.  Thanks to participants in the Fordham Law School Faculty Colloquium, 
Bennett Capers, and especially George Thomas for comments on this Article.  
** Associate, Kobre & Kim LLP and Adjunct Professor of Trial Advocacy, Fordham 
University School of Law. 
1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
2. Id. at 51; see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009) (―In 
Crawford, after reviewing the [Confrontation] Clause‘s historical underpinnings,‖ the Court held that 
the Confrontation Clause ―guarantees a Defendant‘s right to confront those who bear testimony 
against him.‖). 
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particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
3
  The Court reasoned that using 
the reliability of hearsay statements as a reason for dispensing with 
confrontation was incongruous with the Constitution‘s view that confrontation 
is required to assure the reliability of testimonial hearsay.
4
 
Since Crawford, scholars have rightly paid much attention to the question 
of whether a hearsay statement is ―testimonial‖ and thus requires 
confrontation.
5
  However, they have paid virtually no attention to whether a 
statement is hearsay in the first place.  Although less frequently dispositive, 
that question is nonetheless important because only out-of-court statements 
that are hearsay trigger the right to confrontation.
6
  Statements offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted require a judgment about a declarant‘s credibility, 
and it is this need for a credibility determination that triggers the defendant‘s 
confrontation right.
7
  Statements offered only for the fact that they were said, 
and not offered for their truth, do not require confrontation because the 
credibility of the speaker has no bearing on the probative value of the 
evidence.
8
 
This Article argues that courts violate the Confrontation Clause by 
misusing the non-hearsay rubric to admit, without confrontation, two 
categories of testimonial statements.  The first consists of nonassertive 
conduct, which, although exempt from the Federal Rules of Evidence‘s 
(Federal Rules) definition of hearsay, is hearsay under the common law 
definition that was in use when the Confrontation Clause was adopted.  Under 
the historical approach to confrontation, required by the Court‘s opinion in 
Crawford, such conduct, when testimonial, requires confrontation.  
Nonetheless, courts routinely admit testimonial, nonassertive conduct without 
 
3. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).  ―Roberts conditioned the admissibility of all hearsay 
evidence on whether it falls under a ‗firmly rooted hearsay exception‘ or bears ‗particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.‘‖  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).  The 
Supreme Court overruled Roberts in Crawford by ―restoring the unavailability and cross-examination 
requirements.‖  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 825 n.4 (2006); see also Melendez-Diaz, 129 
S. Ct. at 2536 (rejecting the argument that the Confrontation Clause excludes hearsay that is the 
product of neutral, scientific testing as ―little more than an invitation to return to our overruled 
decision in Roberts, which held that evidence with ‗particularized guarantees of trustworthiness‘ was 
admissible notwithstanding the Confrontation Clause‖) (citation omitted). 
4. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61–62 (―Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is 
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.  This 
is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.‖). 
5. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530; Davis, 547 U.S. at 817. 
6. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 n.9 (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)) (―The 
Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the 
truth of the matter asserted.‖). 
7. Street, 471 U.S. at 414 (the confrontation right depends upon the need for cross-examination 
to challenge credibility). 
8. Id. 
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confrontation by erroneously equating it with non-hearsay evidence that does 
not implicate a declarant‘s credibility.  In fact, such evidence implicates the 
declarant‘s credibility, as the common law well understood.  Consequently, 
although nonassertive conduct is exempt from hearsay under a revised 
definition, nonassertive conduct is no different from evidence that was 
inadmissible hearsay at the Founding.  Its admissibility without confrontation 
depends exclusively upon whether it is testimonial, not whether it is 
admissible under modern hearsay policy. 
The second category consists of testimonial statements admitted as non-
hearsay background evidence to explain the investigators‘ actions, even 
though the defendant has not questioned the investigators‘ behavior.  Courts 
routinely admit those statements for their ―effect on the listener‖ to explain 
the course of the investigation.  They hold that such statements raise no 
Confrontation Clause issue because they are not admitted for their truth.  
Nonetheless, the statements‘ admission for that purpose erroneously assumes 
that the reasons for the investigators‘ actions are relevant absent the 
defendant‘s challenge.  If courts admit the statements when there is no charge 
of investigative misconduct to rebut, the jury has to use them for their truth, in 
violation of the defendant‘s confrontation right, if it considers them at all.  
Regardless of whether the jury uses the statements directly as proof of what 
they assert or indirectly as a basis for concluding that information available to 
investigators supports the prosecution‘s claim of the defendant‘s guilt, the 
jury uses the evidence for a substantive purpose, which requires confrontation.  
Only when testimonial statements made to investigators are necessary to rebut 
an express or implied charge that the investigators acted improperly can 
courts justify their admission to explain the investigators‘ behavior as a non-
hearsay purpose that does not require confrontation. 
Consequently, Crawford requires a constitutionally mandated definition of 
hearsay that reflects the full scope of the confrontation right.  This definition 
must trump the federal and state definitions that narrow the scope of hearsay 
to reflect modern policy and require confrontation of testimonial, nonassertive 
conduct.  Also, this definition must trump judicial applications of the hearsay 
rule admitting testimonial statements as non-hearsay unless they are clearly 
relevant to a legitimate non-hearsay purpose.  This means excluding 
testimonial statements as background evidence offered to justify investigators‘ 
conduct unless the defendant first questions it. 
Part II explains the difference between declarant-centered and assertion-
centered definitions of hearsay and shows that the Federal Rules‘ assertion-
centered definition does not comport with the Supreme Court‘s view that the 
Constitution excuses confrontation only when admission of a declarant‘s 
statement does not implicate his credibility.  It argues that courts in post-
Crawford cases have missed this lack of parallelism because they conflate 
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statements offered to show the truth of what the declarant believes, although 
not what he intended to assert, with statements not offered to show anything 
that the declarant believes.  Consequently, courts in many cases confuse 
nonassertive conduct with evidence that is not hearsay because it is not 
offered to show any matter whose truth depends upon the declarant‘s 
credibility.  Such cases also show that nonassertive conduct under the Federal 
Rules‘ definition of hearsay is sometimes testimonial under the Court‘s 
current definition.  Testimonial, nonassertive conduct requires confrontation 
unless there is specific historical support for the proposition that courts, at the 
time of the Founding, exempted nonassertive conduct from confrontation or 
from their understanding of hearsay evidence. 
Part III argues that there is no historical evidence of a Founding-era 
practice by which common law courts exempted nonassertive conduct from 
the definition of hearsay or from the confrontation requirement.  Indeed, the 
only explicit discussion of the issue suggests that, when the court in Wright v. 
Tatham
9
 held in 1837 that hearsay comprised nonassertive conduct, it stated a 
position that it considered already implicit in the common law definition.  In 
any event, Wright offers no suggestion that the court was overruling or 
otherwise rejecting an established, contrary position that existed at the time of 
the Founding.  Without historical evidence of a practice exempting 
nonassertive conduct from confrontation—equivalent to that which the Court 
found sufficient to create a sui generis exemption of dying declarations
10—the 
Sixth Amendment requires confrontation, despite subsequent changes in the 
hearsay definition that reflect evolving evidence policy. 
Part IV proposes changing the basic definition of hearsay back to that of 
the Founding era to include nonassertive conduct.  The change satisfies the 
constitutional command of the Confrontation Clause while providing 
jurisdictions with the option of creating a hearsay exception for nonassertive 
conduct as a matter of hearsay policy.  With minimal disruption to existing 
practice, the proposal ensures that all testimonial hearsay, as understood at the 
Founding and not subject to contemporaneous exception, triggers the 
confrontation right, while allowing the hearsay policy of different 
jurisdictions to determine whether to admit nonassertive conduct that does not 
implicate the Confrontation Clause. 
Adopting a hearsay exception for nonassertive conduct, rather than 
excluding it from the hearsay definition, also generates collateral benefits in 
cases where the confrontation right is not involved.  Admitting a declarant‘s 
nonassertive conduct pursuant to a hearsay exception allows an opponent of 
that evidence to impeach the declarant‘s credibility pursuant to the usual rules 
 
9. (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Exch. Div.). 
10. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2684–86 (2008); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6. 
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allowing impeachment of hearsay declarants, a result that can only enhance 
the accuracy of the fact-finding process.
11
  In contrast, current law imposes a 
double disadvantage on the criminal defendant against whom the prosecution 
offers nonassertive conduct.  He has no confrontation right assuring that he 
can cross-examine the declarant and, once the evidence is admitted, no right 
to impeach the declarant as if he had testified. 
Part V examines cases in which courts found confrontation unnecessary 
because the prosecution offered testimonial statements made to investigators 
only for their ―effect on the listener,‖ to explain why investigators acted as 
they did, and not for their truth.
12
  This Part shows that courts routinely admit 
such testimonial statements for this non-hearsay purpose although the 
defendant did not question the investigators‘ actions.  While courts correctly 
referenced hearsay law‘s distinction between using such statements for their 
truth and merely for the fact that they were heard to explain the investigators‘ 
conduct, the same courts misapplied the non-hearsay rubric in a way that 
potentially rendered the confrontation right useless.  Those courts improperly 
applied the ―effect on listener‖ exception when the defendant did not 
challenge the investigators‘ reasons for acting.  Thus, the ―effect on listener‖ 
exception admits testimonial hearsay for a purpose that, although permissible 
under the hearsay rule, is nonetheless irrelevant.  As a result, juries that 
choose to use it will do so for its truth—its only relevant, though 
impermissible, purpose.  To avoid that result, Part V proposes that admitting 
testimonial hearsay for its effect on investigators is a Confrontation Clause 
violation unless and until the defendant raises an issue about the investigators‘ 
conduct.  Only when used to rebut the defendant‘s claim would the evidence 
be relevant and permissible.  Part VI concludes. 
II.  TESTIMONIAL, NONASSERTIVE CONDUCT 
When deciding whether out-of-court statements require confrontation, 
courts properly consider whether prosecutors have offered such statements for 
the truth of the matter asserted.
13
  If not, confrontation is unnecessary because 
the credibility of the declarant is irrelevant, and there is no reason to worry 
that the absence of cross-examination will undermine the evidence‘s 
reliability.  The exemption from confrontation of statements not offered for 
their truth is frequently stated as a rule holding that only hearsay statements 
trigger the confrontation right.  Nevertheless, equating non-hearsay with 
statements that the prosecution has not offered for their truth is wrong when 
 
11. See infra notes 149–151 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra Part V. 
13. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(c); Street, 471 U.S. at 413–14 (holding that when an out-of-
court statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter, the Confrontation Clause is not 
implicated). 
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we consider the difference between the definition of hearsay most prevalent 
today and the original common law definition retained by a few jurisdictions. 
Courts currently employ different definitions of a hearsay statement.  The 
most common definition is inconsistent with the Court‘s view that the 
Constitution requires confrontation whenever the probative value of a 
testimonial statement depends upon a declarant‘s credibility.  The first 
definition is ―declarant-centered.‖  Under the declarant-centered definition, 
hearsay statements include any out-of-court verbal or nonverbal conduct 
establishing the declarant‘s belief about a fact whose relevancy depends upon 
the accuracy of his belief.
14
  This definition comports with Crawford because 
it includes any statements whose probative value depends upon a declarant‘s 
credibility. 
The second definition of a hearsay statement is ―assertion-centered.‖  It 
excludes statements whose probative value depends upon the declarant‘s 
credibility if the declarant did not intend the statements ―as an assertion‖ or 
the prosecution offers those statements for a reason ―other than the matter 
asserted.‖15  In 1975, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee adopted the 
assertion-centered definition, which is now used in most jurisdictions.
16
  An 
assertion-centered definition establishes that verbal or nonverbal conduct is 
hearsay only when the actor intends by that conduct to assert the fact that its 
proponent is using it to prove.  The rationale for adopting the assertion-based 
test is that the sincerity danger is reduced when a person unintentionally 
reveals his belief in certain facts rather than when he intentionally asserts it, 
and that a person acting on a belief, rather than merely asserting it, will 
ordinarily be more careful about what he perceived or remembers.
17
 
Although codified in the Federal Rules and used in most states, the 
assertion-based definition‘s exclusion of nonassertive conduct18 from hearsay 
is inconsistent with Crawford.  Even proponents of the Federal Rules‘ 
assertion-centered definition concede that nonassertive conduct used to prove 
a declarant‘s beliefs that the proponent contends are accurate implicates the 
 
14. We adopt the terms ―declarant-centered‖ and ―assertion-centered‖ from Professor Roger 
Park‘s classic article “I Didn‟t Tell Them Anything About You”: Implied Assertions as Hearsay 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 MINN. L. REV. 783 (1990). 
15. See FED. R. EVID. 801 & advisory committee‘s notes. 
16. Id.  The Advisory Committee makes explicit the Federal Rules‘ adoption of the assertion-
centered definition, noting that the ―effect of the definition of ‗statement‘ is to exclude from the 
operation of the hearsay rule all evidence of conduct, verbal or nonverbal, not intended as an 
assertion.‖  Id. 
17. Id.  (recognizing that nonverbal conduct not intended as an assertion is ―untested with 
respect to the perception, memory, and narration,‖ but finding that ―these dangers are minimal in the 
absence of an intent to assert and do not justify the loss of the evidence on hearsay grounds‖). 
18. For the sake of simplicity, this Article uses the term ―nonassertive conduct‖ to include 
assertive conduct that is offered for something other than its intended inference. 
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declarant‘s testimonial capacities, and thus, his credibility.  They argue, 
however, that hearsay dangers,
19
 although not eliminated for nonassertive 
conduct, are sufficiently reduced to justify admission.
20
  However significant 
to the policy debate about what the hearsay rule should cover, this argument is 
irrelevant to the application of the Confrontation Clause for the same reason 
that whether testimonial hearsay fits a hearsay exception, justified by reduced 
hearsay dangers, is irrelevant.
21
  Under Crawford and its progeny, whether 
testimonial hearsay is reliable—as previously shown by its qualification under 
a firmly rooted hearsay exception
22—has no bearing on its admissibility 
without confrontation.
23
  The reliability argument for excluding nonassertive 
conduct from the definition of hearsay can have no greater significance than 
 
19. See Park, supra note 14, at 785 n.15.  Park attributes the phrase ―hearsay dangers‖ to 
Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. 
REV. 177 (1948).  Morgan identified sincerity, misuse of language (sometimes called ambiguity or 
narration), perception, and memory as the four ―dangers.‖  Id. at 185–88. 
20. Meanwhile, proponents of the declarant-centered definition argue that the reduction of the 
sincerity, memory, and perception dangers, if any, is overstated or counteracted by an increased 
danger of ambiguity when the jury attempts to infer the declarant‘s beliefs from actions not intended 
to communicate them.  RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES 450–51 
(4th ed. 2006). 
21. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2009) (admissibility without 
confrontation turns on whether a particular statement is testimonial, not whether it fits a hearsay 
exception, even one that usually encompasses non-testimonial statements); Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 61–64 (2004) (admitting reliable hearsay statements ―is fundamentally at odds with the 
right of confrontation‖ because the clause ―is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee . . . 
command[ing] . . . that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of 
cross-examination‖). 
22. The Court had previously held that the Confrontation Clause does not bar admission of a 
non-testifying witness‘s statement against a criminal defendant if the statement possessed ―adequate 
‗indicia of reliability.‘‖ Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).  To meet that test, evidence was 
required to either fall within a ―firmly rooted hearsay exception‖ or bear ―particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.‖  Id. 
23. In overruling Roberts, the Crawford Court noted the problems with the previously 
articulated test:  
Although the results of our decisions have generally been faithful to the 
original meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the same cannot be said of our 
rationales.  Roberts conditions the admissibility of all hearsay evidence on 
whether it falls under a ―firmly rooted hearsay exception‖ or bears 
―particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.‖  This test departs from the 
historical principles identified above in two respects.  First, it is too broad: It 
applies the same mode of analysis whether or not the hearsay consists of ex 
parte testimony.  This often results in close constitutional scrutiny in cases that 
are far removed from the core concerns of the Clause.  At the same time, 
however, the test is too narrow: It admits statements that do consist of ex parte 
testimony upon a mere finding of reliability.  This malleable standard often fails 
to protect against paradigmatic confrontation violations. 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 (internal citation omitted).  
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the reliability argument for excusing confrontation when hearsay fits a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception. 
Federal Rule 801(a) defines ―statement‖ for purposes of the hearsay rule 
as ―(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is 
intended . . . as an assertion.‖  This definition rejects the declarant-centered 
definition.
24
  It excludes nonassertive conduct from hearsay even if that 
conduct is used as a basis from which to infer a declarant‘s beliefs about facts 
that the proponent seeks to prove with the evidence that the declarant believes 
them.
25
  A classic example is evidence that a sea captain sailed with his family 
after subjecting the ship to a thorough inspection, as proof that the vessel was 
seaworthy.
26
  The authors of the Federal Rules decided that, although such 
evidence implicated the captain‘s credibility and was subject to the hearsay 
dangers of misperception, faulty memory, ambiguous narration and 
insincerity, the reduced dangers associated with nonassertive conduct justified 
its exclusion from hearsay.
27
 
To the extent the sea captain did not intend to communicate to anyone the 
seaworthiness of the vessel, his actions would likely show his sincere beliefs 
about the condition of the ship.  When intentionally communicating the 
condition of the ship to another, he would decide whether to report sincerely, 
creating the possibility that he chose to mislead.  When acting upon, rather 
than communicating, his belief, he will be sincere, except in the unlikely 
event that he somehow lies to himself.  Also, acting on his belief about the 
ship‘s seaworthiness by risking the lives of himself and his family, the captain 
is more likely to be careful about his perception and memory of the ship‘s 
condition than he is when he merely reports the ship‘s condition to another. 
Meanwhile, hearsay dangers remain.  There is no certain way to determine 
that the captain did not intend to communicate his belief about the ship, in 
which case the danger of insincerity, although hidden, remains.  Although his 
conduct is not the type ordinarily thought of as intending an assertion, the 
captain may have intended to dupe observers into thinking the ship was safe.  
Perception and memory dangers also remain.  The inspection may have 
missed a flaw, or the captain may have misunderstood or forgotten the flaws 
 
24. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a). 
25. See id. 
26. Park, supra note 14, at 789–90 (citing Wright v. Tatham, (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 488, 516 
(Exch. Div.) (Parke, B.)); EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 250, at 738 (3d ed. 
1984); 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 267, at 103 (rev. ed. 
1979). 
27. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee‘s notes (―No class of evidence is free of the 
possibility of fabrication, but the likelihood is less with nonverbal than with assertive verbal 
conduct.‖); cf. Park, supra note 14, at 791 (―The literature . . . lacks any compelling evidence of 
injustice done by receiving nonverbal conduct containing concealed assertions.  The opponents of 
nonverbal conduct have not found their Sir Walter Raleigh.‖). 
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that made the ship unseaworthy.  Moreover, that the conduct is nonassertive 
may actually increase the narration danger because we infer the captain‘s 
beliefs about the seaworthiness of the ship from actions that are ambiguous 
precisely because the captain did not intend his actions to communicate those 
beliefs.  Perhaps leaving with his family after the inspection showed his belief 
that the ship‘s many flaws made it an appropriate vehicle for teaching them 
the perils of venturing to sea on a dangerous vessel. 
The Federal Rules‘ advisory committee‘s notes make it perfectly clear that 
the rule writers understood that they were exempting nonassertive conduct 
from the definition of hearsay although such conduct required a judgment 
about the declarant‘s credibility.28  The committee also applied a similar 
argument to assertive conduct offered for some reason other than its intended 
assertion, using the classic example provided in Wright v. Tatham.
29
  To help 
establish the competency of a testator (Marsden), the beneficiary of his will 
offered letters written to Marsden in language and about matters that 
suggested the writers‘ belief that Marsden was a person of ordinary 
understanding and thus competent to write his will.
30
  The beneficiary did not 
offer the letters for the truth of their intended assertions about what they 
reported—news of mutual friends, descriptions of an author‘s travels, a 
request that Marsden settle a legal dispute, and an offer to remain in a post to 
which Marsden had appointed the writer—but rather as a basis for inferring 
the writers‘ beliefs that Marsden was capable of understanding and 
responding to their letters.  Though the advisory committee acknowledged 
that the Court of the Exchequer Chamber excluded the letters as hearsay, the 
committee rejected that result to the extent that the letter writers 
unintentionally revealed—rather than intentionally asserted—their belief in 
Marsden‘s competency.  Were the letter writers acting on their belief in the 
testator‘s mental state while having no intention to communicate that belief, 
the evidence would be subject to the same reduced hearsay dangers that 
accompany nonassertive conduct. 
The Wright court confusingly called the letters ―implied statements.‖31  The 
label elided indirect, though intended, assertions—matters the declarant left to 
 
28. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee‘s notes. 
29. Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. at 488–89. 
30. Id. at 489. 
31. Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. at 516–17.  The Wright court wrote:  
[P]roof of a particular fact, which is not of itself a matter in issue, but which is 
relevant only as implying a statement or opinion of a third person on the matter 
in issue, is inadmissible in all cases where such a statement or opinion not on 
oath would be of itself inadmissible. 
Id.  Before the advent of the Federal Rules, courts considered such implied assertions to be hearsay.  
See, e.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 442 (1949); United States v. Pacelli, 491 F.2d 
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implication, though intentionally communicated—with beliefs unintentionally 
revealed while the speaker intentionally asserts something else.
32
  Wright‘s 
holding addresses only the situation where the declarant‘s beliefs are inferred, 
but not intentionally asserted, because the assertion-centered definition already 
encompasses intentional assertions, however indirect or even cryptic.
33
  
Nonetheless, confusion about the scope of ―implied statements‖ led some courts 
to read the Federal Rules‘ rejection of Wright to allow indirect, intended 
assertions to escape the hearsay definition; this is a result for which nobody 
offered justification.
34
  In turn, this created distrust of the Federal Rules‘ 
hearsay definition deep enough to cause some courts and commentators to 
question whether they should not interpret the Federal Rules‘ assertion-centered 
approach as no narrower than Wright‘s declarant-centered approach.35 
Nonetheless, Professor Roger Park, in a 1990 article, set things straight.  
Park clearly explained the difference between the properly understood 
definitions and isolated several categories of evidence where the different 
definitions spawned different results despite some courts and commentators‘ 
contrary wishes.  Park defended the Federal Rules‘ approach against other 
commentators‘ attempts to restore the hearsay definition to its pre-Federal 
Rules‘ condition.36 
This Article‘s thesis does not require us to enter the debate about which 
approach is preferable because the occasion for revisiting the contrasting 
definitions is to decide the scope of the historically determined confrontation 
right, and not the policy-determined hearsay definition.  Nonetheless, 
Professor Park‘s description of evidence for which the definitions make a 
difference provides a useful template for post-Crawford cases in which courts 
applying the assertion-centered definition deviated from the common law.  In 
so doing, those courts exempt from confrontation evidence whose probative 
value depends upon an absent declarant‘s credibility. 
Under the Federal Rules, perhaps the most important category of non-
hearsay that raises a confrontation problem is that of false statements uttered 
 
1108, 1115–17 (2d Cir. 1974); Favre v. Henderson, 464 F.2d 359, 362 (5th Cir. 1972); United States 
v. Williamson, 450 F.2d 585, 590 (5th Cir. 1971). 
32. Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 76 
MINN. L. REV. 367, 419 n.153 (1992). 
33. Park, supra note 14, at 800 (the assertion-based definition incorporates all facts that a 
speaker intended to communicate, whether directly or indirectly). 
34. Id. at 794–801 (discussing misuses of the assertion-based definition).  Stoddard v. State 
illustrates almost all these misuses by arguing that questions, commands, and statements of fact 
requiring a ―multi-step inferential process‖ from the fact asserted to the proposition for whose truth 
the statement is offered cannot be hearsay.  850 A.2d 406, 410–26 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), rev‟d, 
887 A.2d 564 (Md. 2005). 
35. Park, supra note 14, at 787 n.20. 
36. See id.   
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to investigators by a defendant‘s associate which the prosecution offers to 
show the declarant‘s knowledge that the defendant is guilty.37  Such cases 
occur frequently, and because courts properly find the evidence to be non-
hearsay under the assertion-centered definition, they improperly deny 
defendants their right to confront the declarants.  In this circumstance, 
declarants unintentionally reveal their knowledge of the defendant‘s guilt 
while intending to communicate something exculpatory, which the 
government then proves is false.  When persons who are aware of the 
defendant‘s criminal involvement (or lack thereof) speak falsely to mislead 
investigators, courts rightly conceive these statements as non-hearsay under 
Federal Rule 801.  Occasionally, courts make the proper argument: such 
statements are assertive conduct offered for a purpose other than their 
intended assertions and therefore fall outside the Federal Rules‘ assertion-
centered definition of hearsay.
38
   Unfortunately, courts more frequently follow 
a poorly reasoned Supreme Court case, Anderson v. United States.
39
  There, 
the Court confusedly analyzed false statement evidence revealing a 
declarant‘s unsuccessfully disguised beliefs of his and the defendant‘s guilt—
hearsay under the declarant-centered, but not the assertion-centered 
definition—as if it were not hearsay under any definition because it was not 
offered to prove the truth of any matter believed by the declarant.
40
  In 
 
37. Id. at 814–16 (citing White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 603–04 (9th Cir. 1989); United States 
v. Candoli, 870 F.2d 496, 507–08 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Munson, 819 F.2d 337, 339–40 
(1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Hackett, 638 F.2d 1179, 1186–87 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. 
McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1353–54 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Weaver, 565 F.2d 129, 135–36 
(8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kelly, 551 F.2d 760, 764–65 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Cusumano, 429 F.2d 378, 381 (2d Cir. 1970)).  After Crawford, admission of the statements in each 
of these cases without confrontation would violate the Confrontation Clause. 
38. Park, supra note 14, at 836–37.   
[C]ourts seem to have used the concepts of nonassertive conduct, and of 
assertive conduct offered to prove something other than the matter asserted, in a 
manner consistent with the Advisory Committee‘s theory that sincerity dangers 
are lessened.  The cases generally involve utterances classed as non-hearsay that 
raise no real insincerity dangers affecting the purpose for which they are being 
used. . . .  It is unlikely that codefendants who made false statements 
exculpating their accomplices were hoping to incriminate their accomplices. 
Id. 
39. 417 U.S. 211 (1974). 
40. Id. at 219–20.  Professor Park explains that Anderson has little precedential value because 
of ―the obscure way the Court stated the facts and . . . the Court‘s apparent belief that it was using the 
statement in a way that involved no reliance on credibility and hence no need for cross-examination.‖  
Park, supra note 14, at 815 & n.175.  Nonetheless, other courts have repeated its error.  See, e.g., 
Hackett, 638 F.2d at 1186 (arguing that false statements to prove consciousness of guilt ―were 
admitted not for their truth, but merely for the fact that the statements were made‖).  By contrast, that 
beliefs unintentionally revealed by false statements were hearsay under the declarant-centered 
definition was forcibly argued in Lyle v. Koehler, 720 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1983).  In that case, the 
declarant solicited false testimony providing himself and an accomplice with a false alibi.  Id.  
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Anderson, the Court received a declarant‘s false statements made to cover up 
the crime and used against an accomplice to show consciousness of their joint 
guilt.
41
  Yet, when used to show the truth of what the declarant thought, the 
false statement was clearly hearsay under the declarant-centered definition 
because it implicated the speaker‘s credibility.42 
When the question is whether the evidence is hearsay under the Federal 
Rules, the correct rubric for deciding that the false statement evidence is not 
hearsay does not matter, except perhaps to law professors.  But when the issue 
is whether the Constitution requires confrontation, it makes all the difference.  
Applying the correct analysis shows that while the evidence is not hearsay 
under the assertion-based definition, it is hearsay under the common law‘s 
declarant-centered view, thereby implicating the declarant‘s credibility and 
thus triggering the defendant‘s confrontation right.  A Massachusetts appeals 
court in the recent case of Commonwealth v. Pelletier
43
 seemed to suspect as 
much.  In Pelletier, the court cited Anderson, while holding that a wife‘s false 
statement that she received her injuries when she fell down the stairs, offered 
against her defendant-husband accused of battery, was not hearsay and raised 
no confrontation issue because the prosecution did not offer it for its truth.
44
  
The court qualified its ruling by noting that the defendant had not argued in 
his brief that the statement was ―implied hearsay,‖ so under Massachusetts 
appellate procedure, there was no need to address that issue or ―the extent to 
which the principles of the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause are 
coextensive.‖45  The court‘s disclaimer indicated that it understood that the 
prosecution‘s offer of the statements to show them false did not determine 
whether they were hearsay under the declarant-centered definition when the 
prosecution proved their falsity to show the declarant‘s knowledge of the 
defendant‘s guilt.  It simply will not do to suggest, as did the court in United 
States v. Trala,
46
 that Crawford does not apply to a declarant‘s false 
statements when offered to show his knowledge of the defendant‘s guilt 
 
Although one might argue that the defendant‘s guilt was intentionally asserted by the declarant‘s 
request for the false alibi (rather than by the declarant‘s simply providing the defendant with one), 
the court assumed that the request unintentionally revealed the defendant‘s guilt.  Id.  Nonetheless, 
the court found the statement hearsay and its admission a violation of the Confrontation Clause.  Id. 
41. 417 U.S. at 219–20. 
42. Id. at 220; see also Park, supra note 14, at 801 & n.79 (false statements as evidence of 
consciousness of guilt require a judgment about the declarant‘s credibility). 
43. 879 N.E.2d 125 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008). 
44. Id.  The court carefully noted that the ―wife‘s statement was not being offered to prove the 
truth of anything asserted therein,‖ reserving the question of whether the statement was nonetheless 
―implied hearsay‖ when offered for the truth of beliefs that she had not intended to assert.  Id. at 130 
& n.6 (emphasis added). 
45. Id.  
46. 386 F.3d 536, 544–45 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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―because the reliability of testimonial evidence is not at issue.‖47  That is 
plainly false.  At the very least, the declarant‘s perception, memory, and 
narration, and thus credibility, are squarely implicated when the prosecution 
uses false statement evidence in this fashion.  Also, the reduction in the 
sincerity danger is only as good as our estimate that the declarant was not 
deviously intending to inculpate the defendant by falsely exculpating him. 
The Pelletier court sensed the correct issues, while avoiding them for 
procedural reasons, but other courts have simply deprived defendants of their 
confrontation right without realizing the error of conflating the scope of the 
Federal Rules‘ assertion-centered hearsay definition and the confrontation 
right.  For example, in United States. v. Brown,
48
 the government offered the 
statement of Brown‘s co-defendant, Giles, to airport police explaining his 
possession of $23,000 in cash as the profits of his barbershop that he intended 
to use for the purchase of a vehicle.
49
  The government proved the statement 
false, while offering it against Brown, who was traveling with Giles and was 
also in possession of a large amount of cash.
50
  The court held that Giles‘s 
statement was not hearsay, and thus did not raise any confrontation issue, 
because it was not ―introduced for the truth of the matter asserted, but to show 
that he was lying.‖51  Still, it was not hearsay only under the assertion-
centered definition because the prosecution did not offer it for the truth of the 
intended assertion, that is, that the money was barbershop profits to be used to 
buy a car.
52
  The prosecution did prove the lie to show the truth of the 
declarant‟s belief that the source and purpose of the cash that Brown and 
Giles were carrying needed to be hidden from the police because the cash‘s 
source and purpose were illegal.  Under the declarant-centered definition, the 
lie was clearly hearsay because the prosecution offered it for the truth of 
Giles‘s belief that they needed a false explanation for the drug money, 
although his lie unintentionally revealed that belief, rather than intentionally 
asserted it. 
Similarly in United States v. Thompson,
53
 the court held that admission of 
two declarants‘ false statements about paying a contractor for paving their 
driveway raised no hearsay or Confrontation Clause issues despite the 
statements having been made to (and recorded by) police and then repeated in 
the grand jury.
54
  The government introduced the evidence to show that 
 
47. Id. at 544. 
48. 560 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2009). 
49. Id. at 765.  
50. Id.  
51. Id.  
52. Id.  
53. Crim. No. 07-35-GFVT, 2009 WL 331478 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 9, 2009). 
54. Id. 
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―county-purchased materials were being used to improve private property,‖ 
and, ultimately, to prove that the defendants were guilty of misappropriating 
government property by arranging to pave the declarants‘ driveway.55  
Although the government plainly used the declarants‘ beliefs that they had no 
right to the materials to prove that the declarants did not own them, the court 
erroneously reasoned that ―there is no need to assess the credibility of the 
declarant of a false statement‖ and so ―the Confrontation [C]lause is not 
implicated.‖56  By now, it should be apparent why that is wrong.  The 
statements‘ probative value depended upon the accuracy of the declarants‘ 
belief that they were not entitled to use these materials (implicating perception 
and memory dangers) and on the accuracy of the inference that lying about 
paying for the paving showed guilty knowledge of the materials‘ ownership 
rather than something else (implicating narration dangers). 
Finally, in United States v. Blake,
57
 the government proved that the 
defendant‘s wife had told police during a search that money found in the 
Blakes‘ safe had come from the sale of electronics equipment.58  The court 
allowed this statement to be used against the defendant because it was not 
―offered for the truth of the matter asserted (that the money came from 
electronics sales), but, rather, to show that the Blakes‘ inconsistent answers to 
the questions about the money supported the government‘s claim that the 
money came from the sale of illegal drugs.‖59  That inference required the jury 
to find Mrs. Blake‘s explanation false, implicating Mr. Blake with her 
knowledge that he needed a phony explanation for the source of the drug 
money.
60
  Again, the court conflated the Federal Rules hearsay and 
Confrontation Clause questions, finding no Confrontation Clause issue 
because the evidence was not hearsay under Federal Rule 801. 
False statements made to police are particularly important examples of 
nonassertive hearsay because their status as testimonial seems clear.  Indeed, 
if a declarant‘s credibility defines the scope of the Confrontation Clause, the 
only way to avoid the conclusion that Crawford does not require courts to use 
a declarant-centered definition of hearsay would be to argue that, by happy 
coincidence, all evidence excluded from hearsay by the ―intent to assert‖ 
requirement is not testimonial.  That possibility is remote, though not 
impossible.  If the Supreme Court were eventually to find that testimonial 
statements encompass only those in which a declarant intended to 
 
55. Id. at *3–4. 
56. Id. at *4. 
57. 284 F. App‘x 530 (10th Cir. 2008). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 541.  
60. See id. 
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communicate the facts that the prosecution offered the statements to prove, 
then the definition of ―testimonial‖ would exclude the same evidence 
excluded from hearsay by the assertion-centered test.  But the Court has not 
yet applied, or even suggested, such a narrow view of what is testimonial. 
Thus far, to determine whether a declarant‘s statements are testimonial, 
courts have focused upon such formulations as whether the statement was 
made ―under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably 
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial‖ or, if 
made in response to police interrogation, whether circumstances ―objectively 
indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove 
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.‖61  These 
definitions render it nearly certain that the declarants‘ statements in all the 
false statement cases are testimonial, although meeting only the declarant-
centered definition of hearsay.  The declarants knew very well that they were 
making statements that could be used prosecutorially and would be available 
for use in a subsequent trial.  Moreover, the primary purpose of the 
questioning to which they responded was to discover past events potentially 
relevant to criminal prosecution.  The only questions are whether it matters 
that the declarants did not anticipate the statements would be used in the way 
the prosecution seeks to use them, or whether they did not intend the 
statements to be inculpatory at all.  The Court‘s recent opinion in Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts,
62
 where it held that the Sixth Amendment requires 
confrontation of a police chemist who prepared a report showing that the 
substance possessed by the defendant was cocaine, strongly suggests that 
neither factor is determinative.
63
 
First, the Court rejected the argument that statements need be 
―accusatory‖ to be testimonial.64  When the prosecution offers a declarant‘s 
statements for their truth, the declarant is a witness against the defendant, 
even though the substance of the statements is hardly necessary to convict.
65
  
According to the Court, the Constitution contemplates only two categories of 
witness: those against and those in favor of the defendant.  There is no ―third 
category of witnesses, helpful to the prosecution, but somehow immune from 
 
61. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004); see also Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531–33 (2009); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 813 (2006); 
United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 187–92 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 
923–24 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 21 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 358–60 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 673–74 
(6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228–29 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Mills, 
446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1121–22 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
62. 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2542 (2009). 
63. See id. 
64. Id. at 2533–34. 
65. See id. at 2534. 
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confrontation‖ because the evidence the witness provides is insufficiently 
inculpatory or his relationship with the defendant is not adversarial.
66
  Under 
Melendez-Diaz, if the prosecution offered a chemist‘s report saying that a 
tested sample belonging to a person other than the defendant was negative for 
contraband to rebut the defendant‘s suggestion that it contaminated the 
defendant‘s sample with illegal drugs, the report would be no less hearsay 
than that of the original chemist‘s statement that the defendant‘s sample tested 
positive for illegal drugs. 
Second, there is no suggestion that because a witness may unwittingly 
spill the beans, whether in response to police interrogation or when 
voluntarily speaking to investigators in an attempt to mislead them, the 
statements made during the attempt to mislead are not testimonial.
67
  The 
Court said, ―[C]onfrontation is designed to weed out not only the fraudulent 
[witness], but the incompetent one as well.‖68  Thus, even if nonassertive 
conduct raises no sincerity danger, confrontation is nonetheless required to 
probe the witness‘s other testimonial capacities and to expose unreliable 
testimony of all stripes. 
Finally, given the Court‘s repeated description of grand jury testimony 
and affidavits as core instances of testimonial statements, it is hard to imagine 
how they become non-testimonial when offered to prove something that the 
declarant did not intend to assert.
69
  It seems no more likely that the Court 
would find statements made to police and in the grand jury not testimonial 
because the speaker unwittingly revealed damaging information about the 
defendant, than it would hold that a witness was not testifying when he did the 
same thing in court.  Routine instructions tell jurors to evaluate not only what 
witnesses say, but how they say it.
70
  What is demeanor evidence if not a 
 
66. Id.  Even if there were a requirement that the statements be sufficiently inculpatory, false 
statements will often meet it because, however unintentionally, they provide damning proof. 
67. Id. at 2535 (―[N]o authority . . . hold[s] that a person who volunteers his testimony is any 
less a witness against the defendant than one who is responding to interrogation.‖) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
68. Id. at 2537. 
69. Id. at 2531–32 (affidavits and prior testimony are testimonial). 
70. See, e.g., 4 LEONARD SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL 
§ 76.01 (2007) (Instruction 76-1). 
How do you determine where the truth lies?  You watched each witness testify.  
Everything a witness said or did on the witness stand counts in your 
determination.  How did the witness impress you?  Did he appear to be frank, 
forthright and candid, or evasive and edgy as if hiding something?  How did the 
witness appear; what was his demeanor—that is, his carriage, behavior, bearing, 
manner and appearance while testifying?  Often it is not what a person says but 
how he says it that moves us. 
Id. 
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series of verbal and nonverbal clues that reveal, often unwittingly, what the 
witness actually believes?  What a witness lets slip is as much a part of his 
live testimony as that which he intends to communicate, and seeing why it 
should or how it could be otherwise with out-of-court statements is 
exceedingly difficult.
71
 
A second important category of nonassertive conduct is illustrated by 
United States v. Zenni.
72
  In that classic case, the court admitted evidence that, 
while searching the premises of an alleged bookmaker, the police received 
calls in which anonymous callers attempted to place bets.
73
  Relying on the 
Federal Rules‘ rejection of Wright v. Tatham, under which the calls would be 
declarant-centered hearsay,
74
 the Zenni court determined that they were not 
hearsay under the assertion-based definition.  Many courts have followed suit, 
though Zenni is not without its critics.
75
 
At one point, the court treated the case as though the calls trying to place 
bets were pure nonassertive conduct equivalent to the ship captain‘s actions, 
 
71. The entire notion of ―testimonial‖ hearsay is built on the idea that the Constitution requires 
like treatment of witnesses who testify against the defendant at trial and those who ―bear testimony‖ 
against the defendant in out-of-court statements. 
72. 492 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980). 
73. Id. at 465.  
74. The Zenni court was prescient about the hearsay status of such calls under the common law.  
In Regina v. Kearley, [1992] 2 AC 228 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.), relying on Wright, 
the House of Lords found anonymous calls ordering drugs on premises being searched by police to 
be hearsay.  In 2003, Parliament enacted comprehensive hearsay reform whose effect was to exclude 
such calls from the definition of hearsay.  See infra note 113. 
75. See, e.g., State v. Kutz, 2003 WI App 205, ¶¶ 45–46, 671 N.W.2d 660.  Believing that the 
bettors implicitly intended to assert that bets were taken on the premises, the court wrote: 
[W]e are not persuaded by the analysis in Zenni . . . because that analysis 
assumes without explanation that an assertion does not include an intended 
expression of a fact, opinion, or condition if it is implicit in the words used.  
Moreover, the court in Zenni acknowledged that some utterances might be 
intended as an assertion even though the ―words [were] non-assertive in form‖ 
and such utterances would require a preliminary determination of intent: for 
example, an airport security inspector that says ―go on through‖ to a passenger 
after using a metal detector on them might intend to assert that the passenger did 
not have a gun.  Zenni, 492 F. Supp. at 469 n.21.  We also observe that, even 
when treatises describe the rule in federal courts to be that implicit assertions 
are not hearsay, they often point out exceptions.  See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE, supra [note 25], § 250, at 111–12 n.29 (noting in a footnote, that 
when the utterance ―it will stop raining in an hour‖ is offered to prove it is 
raining, that is hearsay, because ―the fact to be proved is a necessary implication 
of the utterance‖).   
We conclude that the preferable approach is to include within the meaning 
of ―assertion‖ in Wis. Stat. § 908.01(1) an expression of a fact, opinion, or 
condition that is implicit in the words of an utterance as long as the speaker 
intended to express that fact, opinion, or condition. 
Id. 
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stating that ―the utterance, ‗Put $2 to win on Paul Revere in the third at 
Pimlico,‘ is a direction and not an assertion of any kind, and therefore can be 
neither true nor false.‖76  The analysis ignored the way in which virtually all 
communication has some intended assertion associated with it, which should 
cause us to understand the utterance above to assert, ―I want to place a $2 bet 
with you on Paul Revere in the third at Pimlico.‖77  Read that way, the caller 
is effectively asserting his belief that bets are taken on the premises at the 
same time that the act of calling and placing the bet is (perhaps) 
unintentionally revealing the same thing.
78
  That does not necessarily make 
the evidence hearsay under the Federal Rules, but it puts it in the more 
problematic category of ―assertive conduct not offered for its intended 
assertion,‖ like the conduct in Wright.79 
Properly analyzed, Zenni is more problematic than the false statement 
cases where the beliefs revealed and asserted by the declarant‘s words are 
effective opposites, offering an assurance that, when we use the words to 
establish inferences from their falsity, they are free of any intent to assert.  In 
contrast, when we use the calls to show the callers‘ beliefs that gambling 
occurs on the premises, but not their desire to place a bet, we cannot be nearly 
so sure that the inference is free of an intent to assert the beliefs we are using 
it to prove.  This has moved some courts to find the calls hearsay, even under 
the Federal Rules, after weighing the extent to which the callers‘ beliefs about 
the premises are unintentionally revealed versus intentionally asserted. 
Nonetheless, most courts have opted to call this type of evidence non-
hearsay under the Federal Rules‘ assertion-centered definition, raising the 
possibility that confrontation is nonetheless required because the proof is 
hearsay under the declarant-centered view.  In many cases, such evidence will 
not be testimonial because the callers will not know that they are speaking to 
authorities or, if they do, will be unlikely to place bets or ask for drugs.  But in 
other cases, such calls can be testimonial.  Weems v. State provides a recent 
example of how this can occur.
80
  In Weems, several persons approached a 
residence where narcotics officers were executing a search warrant and asked 
for the defendant by his nickname.  The court held that the requests to see the 
 
76. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. at 466 n.7. 
77. Elsewhere, the Zenni court acknowledged that the callers‘ unstated belief that bets were 
taken at that number was excluded from hearsay only if they did not intend to communicate their 
belief.  Id. at 468–69 & n.21. 
78. Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick profitably discuss Zenni and similar borderland 
problems as cases of ―mixed act and assertion‖ requiring judges to weigh the conduct‘s performative 
and assertive aspects. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: 
PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES § 8.22 (3d ed. 2009). 
79. Park, supra note 14, at 800–01. 
80. 673 S.E.2d 50 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). 
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defendant were ―verbal acts not introduced for their truth but rather to connect 
Weems to the residence and the cocaine seized from that location.‖81  The 
court went on to say that the verbal act designation also meant that there was 
no Confrontation Clause violation because ―the Clause does not bar the 
admission of statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the 
matter asserted.‖82 
Such evidence is hearsay under the declarant-centered view even if it is 
not hearsay under the assertion-centered definition because the declarants 
were mostly revealing, not asserting, their beliefs that the defendant could be 
found there.  Either way, the probative value of their statements clearly 
depends upon their credibility.  Any residual confusion about whether such 
evidence would be hearsay under the declarant-centered view follows from 
the Weems court‘s confusing use of the term ―verbal act‖ for assertive conduct 
offered for a purpose other than its intended assertion. 
The term ―verbal act‖ is better reserved for evidence that is not hearsay 
because its occurrence is probative despite the actor‘s beliefs.83  A classic 
example is a statement assenting to a contract while the speaker secretly 
refuses to be bound.  Where the law makes the speaker‘s verbalized assent 
probative on the issue of whether he concluded a binding contract, despite his 
unexpressed reservations, the assent is a verbal act.  A true verbal act is 
relevant merely by virtue of its having been spoken and is not hearsay under 
either the assertion-centered or declarant-centered definitions.  In Weems, 
however, asking for the defendant at a particular location is probative of the 
fact that he can be found there because it shows the declarant‘s belief that the 
defendant can be found there.  Unlike the classic verbal act, the probative 
value of the proof depends on the declarant‘s credibility, implicating, at the 
least, his perception and memory that the defendant hangs out there.  The 
proof is not exempted from hearsay because it is a verbal act making the truth 
of any matter irrelevant.  It is not hearsay only under the assertion-centered 
view because the declarant‘s beliefs about the defendant‘s whereabouts are 
not intentionally asserted, but rather unintentionally revealed by the declarant 
asking for him there. 
Weems was not entirely clear about whether the persons asking for the 
defendant by his nickname knew they were speaking to police.  At one point, 
the court described steps that the officers took to disguise themselves on the 
 
81. Id. at 54.  
82. Id. at 53 n.2. 
83. Park, supra note 14, at 833.  Professor Park notes that the term ―verbal act‖ is 
unobjectionable if it is reserved for circumstances when the act of uttering words has legal 
consequences.  The label creates problems, however, when courts use it to refer to verbal conduct 
that is not hearsay because it is nonassertive, but is not legally operative language.  Such conduct 
involves hearsay dangers.  Id. 
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premises, which resulted in their arresting several persons who came to the 
door asking for drugs and the defendant.
84
  But when the court analyzed the 
statements of the persons asking for the defendant, it made no reference to the 
requests for drugs.
85
  This suggests that some of the callers arriving at the door 
may have arrived after the police revealed themselves and simply asked for 
the defendant without revealing their (possibly illegal) purpose.  Even if these 
were not the facts of Weems, this scenario clearly illustrates how we can 
expect declarants in cases besides the false statement cases to engage in 
nonassertive conduct that implicates defendants, even in the presence of 
police.  Similar cases will undoubtedly include those where the speakers know 
that they are talking to police because the nonassertive conduct that connects a 
defendant to illegality need not inculpate the speaker.  Asking for Weems by 
nickname associates him with the location at which the drugs were found, 
despite whether the visitors gave any reason at all for coming, or innocently 
identified themselves as there to, say, chat about the Yankees or take the 
defendant to tea. 
Like the false statements, the nonassertive conduct associating the 
defendant with the drug location is not exempt from being testimonial because 
the prosecution uses it in unanticipated ways or because it is not accusatory, 
sufficiently inculpatory, or adversarial.
86
  But there is a difference that may 
matter.  The actors whose conduct connects the defendant to illegality are less 
likely to anticipate that they are giving evidence at all, even if their actions are 
knowingly undertaken in the presence of police.  The declarants of false 
statements are fully aware that they are providing information to the 
authorities that they may use as evidence, making that information the 
functional equivalent of live testimony. 
The statements associating a person with illegality that fit the nonassertive 
conduct rubric are harder to conceive as functional testimony.  The declarant 
of such nonassertive conduct, like the declarant who asks the police for 
Weems, should not be thinking at all about providing evidence.  If a person is 
aware that he is potentially providing evidence to the police, rather than just 
acting in their presence, his statement should probably no longer qualify as 
nonassertive conduct.  It thus remains an open question whether the Court will 
want to make clear that the inquiry into whether a declarant would understand 
that statements made to police can be ―used prosecutorially‖ and ―would be 
available for use in a subsequent trial‖ should include an inquiry into whether 
 
84. Weems, 673 S.E.2d at 52. 
85. Id. at 53–54. 
86. See supra notes 61–68 and accompanying text. 
1434 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [93:1415 
the declarant likely understood that he was providing evidence at all.
87
  
Nonetheless, the central point remains that the Weems court never asked 
whether Weems‘s visitors‘ statements were testimonial because it erroneously 
assumed that the assertion-centered definition of hearsay determined the 
extent of Weems‘s confrontation right. 
Some statements that courts find fit the mold of non-hearsay ―connecting‖ 
statements will undoubtedly remain testimonial.  Washington v. McKinney 
provides an example.
88
  The defendant was charged with dealing drugs.  She 
admitted using, but denied dealing, drugs.  She instead claimed that her 
boyfriend, who used her cell phone, was dealing.
89
  While detaining 
McKinney, the police had answered a call on her cell phone in which Crystal 
Donovan complained that she had been waiting for McKinney to bring her 
drugs in the parking lot outside a hotel.
90
  After receiving Donovan‘s 
description, the officer who had answered the phone offered to bring the 
drugs.
91
  Subsequently, a uniformed officer approached Donovan in the 
parking lot.
92
  Donovan volunteered to the officer that she was there to meet 
McKinney, whom she described as her friend.
93
  When the officer asked 
Donovan why she was meeting McKinney, she said first, that she was going 
to give McKinney a ride, and later, that she wanted to hang out with her.
94
  
The court held that Donovan‘s statements were not hearsay because they were 
not offered for their truth, but rather to show ―that Donovan knew McKinney 
and that McKinney was nearby at the Sunrise Motel.‖95  The court further 
held that since Donovan‘s statements were not offered for their truth, there 
was no Confrontation Clause issue.
96
 
 
87. Other circumstances raising this issue include the flight or suicide of the subject of an 
investigation, or his destruction of evidence, when the subject knows that the police are investigating 
him.  Courts have admitted these actions as nonassertive conduct revealing the subject‘s knowledge 
of the unlawful nature of the activities for which he was being investigated or the incriminating 
nature of the materials destroyed, which knowledge may then be admissible against others connected 
to those activities or materials.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Colson, 490 A.2d 811, 824 (Pa. 1985) 
(suicide of defendant‘s accomplice admissible against defendant).  In these cases, the declarants 
surely know that their actions will become known to police and thus available for use in a subsequent 
trial, but they may have no immediate awareness that they are providing evidence when they 
undertake their actions. 
88. Nos. 58201-1-I, 58202-0-I, 2007 WL 2297111, at *1–3 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2007) 
(per curiam). 
89. Id. at *3. 
90. Id. at *2. 
91. Id. at *4. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id.  
96. Id. 
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One can debate whether using the statements for Donovan‘s knowledge of 
McKinney and McKinney‘s nearby location—potentially important to 
determine whether McKinney was actually the source of the drugs or a foil for 
her boyfriend—was hearsay under the Federal Rules‘ definition.97  But Zenni 
itself is debatable, as are many close questions at the border created by the 
assertion-centered view‘s distinction between beliefs that are unintentionally 
revealed and those that are indirectly, though intentionally, asserted.
98
  
However, the issue is not whether the McKinney court decided the hearsay 
question correctly under the Federal Rules.  It is whether it denied the 
defendant her confrontation right by erroneously assuming the applicability of 
the assertion-based definition to the Confrontation Clause.  In this case, the 
statements ―connecting‖ McKinney to Donovan and the Sunrise Hotel were 
clearly testimonial, having been made to a uniformed officer in response to 
his inquiries into drug activity.
99
  Donovan‘s credibility was implicated even 
when her statements were used only to show that Donovan knew McKinney 
and that she was nearby.
100
  Like all testimonial, declarant-centered hearsay, 
the statement triggered McKinney‘s confrontation right unless there is a 
special reason why the Confrontation Clause exempts it. 
As with false exculpatory statements, ―connecting‖ statements often 
escape confrontation scrutiny because courts confuse nonassertive conduct 
with statements that are not offered for their truth.  The primrose path to 
erroneously admitting testimonial, nonassertive conduct in this manner is 
illustrated by United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez.
101
  The court admitted ten 
calls requesting heroin received on the defendant‘s seized cell phone to 
―support an inference that Rodriguez was . . . dealing heroin.‖102  It 
erroneously held that the calls to Rodriguez were not hearsay because the 
inference from their being placed to his involvement ―[did] not depend on the 
callers‘ truthfulness, memory, or perception.‖103  It claimed that the calls were 
probative merely because they were made, despite the truth of the ―declarants‘ 
 
97. Donovan‘s responses to the officer‘s questions went beyond the acts of requesting or 
buying drugs in the earlier calls and are therefore arguably not covered by Zenni‘s rationale that the 
declarant was performing an act rather than intentionally communicating something. 
98. For example, the court in McKinney admitted Donovan‘s call to McKinney‘s cell phone in 
which she had complained of ―‗waiting for over 20 minutes for her shit from [McKinney],‘‖ and 
another call in which the caller said that McKinney ―had [taken her boyfriend‘s] ‗stuff‘ and ‗was now 
selling [it].‘‖  2007 WL 2297111, at *2.  Admitting these statements to show McKinney‘s 
involvement in selling, but not for their literal truth, stretches, if not obliterates, the limits of Zenni, 
or perhaps illustrates why Zenni was wrongly decided in the first instance.  
99. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
100. McKinney, 2007 WL 2297111, at *2–4. 
101. 565 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2009). 
102. Id. at 315. 
103. Id. 
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belief that the defendant could supply the desired heroin.‖104  On that analysis, 
however, the calls were admissible without confrontation even if government 
agents intentionally orchestrated them for the express purpose of generating 
evidence for use at trial.  One hoped that if such a case arose, the court would 
immediately realize that calls of this type are probative of the defendant‘s 
involvement only if offered to show the truth of the declarants‘ beliefs that the 
defendant is involved.  Thus, the government-generated calls are testimonial 
hearsay requiring confrontation, if they are admissible at all, and the 
independently initiated calls are admissible without confrontation only 
because they are non-testimonial, nonassertive conduct, and not because their 
probative value is independent of the callers‘ credibility. 
Such hope, however, was dashed in United States v. Cesareo-Ayala.
105
  
The court held that monitored calls made to the defendant by Mendez, a 
recently arrested coconspirator, were not testimonial hearsay although 
requested and supervised by government agents.  Among other things, 
Mendez told Cesareo-Ayala that Mendez had his money from an earlier sale 
and needed to get more drugs from him to sell.
106
  The court held that the calls 
were not hearsay requiring confrontation because Mendez‘s testimonial 
capacities were not implicated when the calls were considered as proof of 
their business relationship rather than for any implicit assertion made for the 
―benefit of the officers.‖107  That analysis would undoubtedly be true if 
Mendez‘s statements were adopted by Cesareo-Ayala during the call, and 
hence admissible pursuant to Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(B) as Cesareo-Ayala‘s 
adopted admissions.  But the court essentially disavowed this rubric when it 
analogized the calls to those in Rodriguez-Lopez where the defendant never 
participated.
108
  Apparently, the Cesareo-Ayala jury had never been instructed 
to consider Mendez‘s statements only insofar as Cesareo-Ayala‘s responses 
―manifested an adoption or belief in [their] truth.‖109  Thus, to avoid the 
confrontation requirement, the court held that Mendez‘s statements, like those 
in Rodriguez-Lopez, could stand alone because they were somehow probative 
apart from their truth.
110
   
Nonetheless, the analysis is similarly flawed.  Apart from anything that 
Cesareo-Ayala said in response, the probative value of Mendez‘s attempts to 
 
104. Id. 
105. 576 F.3d 1120 (10th Cir. 2009). 
106. Id. at 1129–30. 
107. Id. at 1129. 
108. Officers intercepted the calls.  Id. 
109. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B). 
110. Concurring, Judge Kelly noted that the court‘s faulty non-hearsay analysis invited 
collision with Crawford; he would have acknowledged constitutional error, but found it harmless.  
United States v. Cesareo-Ayala, 576 F.3d 1120, 1131–32 (Kelly, J., concurring). 
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pay Cesareo-Ayala for drugs already received from him, and to obtain more 
drugs from him to sell, depended entirely on the truth of Mendez‘s belief that 
Cesareo-Ayala was Mendez‘s supplier.  Moreover, those statements, made at 
the urging of police to obtain evidence against Cesareo-Ayala, were clearly 
testimonial.  Even assuming that they were properly admitted as non-hearsay, 
nonassertive conduct, their admission—like admission of the statements in 
McKinney—violated the defendant‘s confrontation right unless there is 
historical evidence showing that only assertion-based hearsay triggered the 
right to confront an absent declarant at the time of the Founding. 
III.  CONFRONTATION OF NONASSERTIVE CONDUCT AT THE FOUNDING 
Rather than defining the scope of the confrontation right by reference to 
the reliability concerns informing hearsay policy, Crawford defines the scope 
of the requirement by reference to common law rules governing admissibility 
of testimonial hearsay at the time of the Constitution‘s adoption.111  History 
requires using the declarant-centered hearsay definition, however 
inconvenient.  Before twentieth-century critiques resulted in the Federal 
Rules‘ revision of the hearsay definition to encompass only intended 
assertions, the common law employed the declarant-centered definition.  
Wright v. Tatham, decided in 1837 and affirmed in 1838,
112
 pronounced the 
authoritative view of the common law on the subject.  There, the Court of the 
Exchequer Chamber held that a declarant‘s beliefs about facts unintentionally 
revealed by the declarant‘s nonassertive conduct or by conduct not intended to 
assert those beliefs amounted to ―implied statements,‖ and thus, constituted 
hearsay.
113
  Although the Federal Rules rejected Wright in 1975 when Federal 
Rule 801 narrowly defined ―statements‖ to include only intended assertions, 
the declarant-centered view of Wright existed at the Founding.  Under 
Crawford, therefore, the declarant-centered definition of hearsay must 
determine whether the Constitution requires confrontation. 
Moreover, courts must require confrontation for nonassertive conduct 
because the Supreme Court has held that declarants‘ statements that the 
prosecution has not offered for their truth are exempt from confrontation only 
 
111. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43–56 (2004). 
112. (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Exch. Div.), aff‟d, (1838) 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L.). 
113. 112 Eng. Rep. at 517.  English courts continued to endorse that view, upholding Wright 
against challenge in 1992.  See R v. Kearley, [1992] 2 AC 228 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(U.K.).  In 2003, Parliament enacted comprehensive hearsay reform whose effect, according to the 
court in Regina v. Sukadeve Singh, [2006] EWCA Crim. 660, [2006] 2 Crim. App. 12, was to reverse 
Kearley and, perhaps, entirely overrule Wright.  Section 115 of the Criminal Justice Act of 2003 
states that hearsay statements include matters stated only if ―the purpose, or one of the purposes, of 
the person making the statement appears to the court to have been—(a) to cause another person to 
believe the matter, or (b) to cause another person to act or a machine to operate on the basis that the 
matter is as stated.‖  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 115 (Eng.).  
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because the declarants‘ credibility is irrelevant to the statements‘ probativity.  
When the prosecution uses such conduct to infer the declarant‘s beliefs in 
certain facts, which beliefs are then used to prove the existence of those facts, 
the declarant‘s credibility is clearly relevant to the statements‘ probative 
value.  Simply wrong are courts that have equated statements offered for the 
truth of beliefs that declarants did not intend to assert with statements that are 
not hearsay by any definition because the prosecution has not offered them for 
the truth of any beliefs held by the declarants, as even the proponents of the 
assertion-centered definition embodied in Federal Rule 801 conceded. 
The history contains no evidence that nonassertive conduct was 
considered exempt from hearsay or from the common law‘s requirement of 
confrontation.  Letters similar to those at issue in Wright had been admitted in 
the Ecclesiastical and Prerogative Courts—which handled civil cases without 
a jury—but the Court of King‘s Bench, Court of Exchequer Chamber, and 
House of Lords in Wright made clear that these cases established no precedent 
for the common law courts in which such evidence had never been received.  
Similarly, there was nothing in the definition of hearsay that today includes 
the phrase ―truth of the matter asserted‖ that made the assertion-centered 
approach an implicit part of Founding-era lawyers‘ conception of 
hearsay/confrontation and from which the common law subsequently 
departed.  Similarly, there is no evidence that Founding-era lawyers 
entertained a definition of ―statement‖ that excluded nonassertive conduct that 
the Wright court overturned by including nonassertive conduct within the 
ambit of implied statements governed by the hearsay rule and confrontation 
requirements. 
The Wright case serves as a useful guide for ascertaining how hearsay 
would have been understood at the time of the Founding.  Although decided 
fifty years after the Constitution‘s framing, Wright was nothing if not 
thoroughly litigated, and the key issue to the precedent-bound judges was 
whether precedent excluded nonassertive conduct.
114
  Yet Sir Frederick 
Pollock, the letters‘ proponent, conceded the nonexistence of common law 
precedent for the proposition that letters sent to Marsden (the testator)—which 
showed the writers‘ belief that he was capable of understanding matters 
contained in the letters, and which, in turn, would show him possessed of the 
capacity to write a will—were admissible.115  Noting precedent in the 
Ecclesiastical and Prerogative Courts for receiving such letters on the issue of 
 
114. The story of the entire litigation is well told in John M. Maguire, The Hearsay System: 
Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REV. 741, 749–60 (1961). 
115. Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. at 498 (―No instances have been found of decisions as to this kind 
of evidence in the Courts of the Common Law.‖); see also id. at 511 (Bosanquet, J.) (―No precedent 
has been referred to in which such evidence has been admitted upon a trial at law.‖). 
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a testator‘s competency—where ―[i]t is usual . . . to plead that the person 
whose sanity is in question was treated of a man of sound mind‖—Pollock 
argued that ―the same rule (which is grounded in good sense) should . . . 
prevail in both courts.‖116  Nonetheless, the judges unanimously rejected 
Pollock‘s argument.117  Although some judges would have admitted the 
letters, they would have done so only because they found sufficient reason to 
believe that the testator had acted competently in response to those letters, 
whose probative value would then lie in giving context to the actions that 
suggested his sanity.
118
  Thus, even those judges who would have admitted the 
letters did not believe they were competent evidence in common law courts of 
the writers‘ beliefs about the testator‘s sanity, from which one could infer that 
he was sane.
119
 
The reasons for excluding the letters were exactly those one would expect.  
The statements were not made under oath and were not subject to cross-
examination.
120
  Moreover, the letters‘ potential reliability was insufficient 
 
116. Id. at 498. 
117. ―[N]one of the judges who participated in the final hearing of the case flatly committed 
himself to the proposition that the three letters should have been admitted as falling outside the 
hearsay area.‖  Maguire, supra note 114, at 755–56 (citing Lord Chancellor Cottenham in Wright v. 
Tatham, (1838) 7 Eng. Rep. 559, 597 (H.L.)). 
118. Wright, 112 Eng. Rep. at 508 (Gurney, B.); id. at 518–19 (Parke, B.) (reporting that there 
was no difference among the judges on the principle that the letters were inadmissible as proof of the 
declarants‘ belief in Marsden‘s sanity, but that some judges found sufficient basis to believe that 
Marsden had acted ―with reference to the letters,‖ making them admissible to explain such acts, and 
candidly conceded that if admitted for that purpose ―no rule of law could prevent their full effect 
from being produced on the minds of the jury‖); see also Maguire, supra note 114, at 754–55. 
119. At least one Prerogative Court Judge found that the decision of the Court of King‘s Bench 
excluding the letters in Wright was no precedent for excluding them in Ecclesiastical and Prerogative 
Courts.  112 Eng. Rep. at 498 (noting two unreported decisions by Sir Herbert Jenner, Commissary 
of the Prerogative Court of Canterbury, in which Wright was cited ―without success‖). 
120. Id. at 500 (Sir Cresswell, arguing for Tatham against admission) (―All the letters were 
inadmissible, because they presented statements which could not be verified by oath, and subjected 
to the test of cross-examination.‖); id. at 515 (Parke, B.) (―[T]hey are mere hearsay evidence, 
statements of the writers, not on oath, of the truth of the matter in question.‖). 
The administering of an oath furnishes some guarantee for the sincerity of the 
opinion; and the power of cross-examination gives an opportunity of testing the 
foundation and the value of it.  Such being the general rule, it is necessary for 
the party who brings forward evidence not on oath to show some recognised 
exception to the general rule, within which it falls. 
Id. at 506 (Coltman, J.). 
If the writers of these letters were produced as witnesses and examined upon 
oath, their opinion would be receivable in evidence, because the grounds of 
their knowledge and the credibility of their testimony might be ascertained by 
cross-examination; but I know of no rule by which the opinion, however clearly 
expressed, of a person, however well informed, is receivable in evidence, unless 
it be given in the course of legal examination. 
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grounds from which to fashion a new exception, at least for judges who were 
not inclined to do so.  Arguing for Tatham and against admission of the 
letters, Sir Cresswell stated the law as follows: 
It is urged on the other side that such evidence ought to be 
received, because it would, in the ordinary course of life, have 
some effect on the mind; but that is a reason for excluding it, 
if not legitimately entitled to attention according to general 
rules.  In a particular case the assertion, without oath, of a 
respectable man might influence a reasonable mind; but the 
rule, established for the safe administration of justice in 
general, is, that evidence unconfirmed by oath, and not 
subject to cross-examination, shall not be received.
121
 
Responding specifically to the claim that ―the expressions in [the letters] 
are not to be presumed ironical or insincere,‖122—an argument not unlike the 
reduced sincerity danger made by the advisory committee for excluding such 
proof from hearsay—Sir Cresswell responded, ―if the evidence were given in 
the ordinary manner by witnesses, that point might be tried by cross-
examination.‖123 
The court also responded to the claim that nonassertive conduct was more 
reliable because declarants act upon their beliefs rather than merely assert 
them.  Baron Parke rejected the distinction between merely asserting and 
acting upon beliefs as a reason for excluding nonassertive conduct.  He 
reasoned that even assertive conduct, such as sending a letter claiming that the 
testator was competent, ―affords an inference that such an act would not have 
been done unless the statement was true, or believed to be true.‖124  As a 
result, accepting the argument would lead to the ―indiscriminate admission of 
hearsay evidence of all manner of facts.‖125  However wrongly one may think 
that the judges responded to Sir Pollock‘s policy arguments, there was simply 
no doubt that they agreed that the issue was one of altering the hearsay rules 
with which they were familiar: 
[I]t is clear that an acting to a much greater extent and degree 
upon such statements . . . would not make the statements 
admissible. . . .  [I]f a wager to a large amount had been made 
 
Id. at 511 (Bosanquet, J.). 
 
121. Id. at 500. 
122. Id.  Sir Pollock argued, ―The test of sincerity . . .  is that respectable parties openly do that 
which would disgrace them if they acted against their belief.‖  Id. at 506. 
123. Id. at 500. 
124. Id. at 516 (Parke, B.). 
125. Id. 
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as to the matter . . . , the payment of that wager, however 
large the sum, would not be admissible to prove the truth of 
the matter. . . .  You would not have had any right to present 
it to the jury as raising an inference of the truth of the fact, on 
the ground that otherwise the bet would not have been paid.  
It is . . . nothing but the mere statement of that fact, with 
strong evidence of the belief of it by the party making it.
126
 
One may fault the opinion for begging the question (maybe paying a bet 
should be excluded too?), but one cannot deny that Baron Parke conceived the 
existing general rule to exclude the proof.  Without authority for doing so, the 
court was hardly going to create an exception
127
 or suggest that nonassertive 
conduct was implicitly excluded from the conception of hearsay evidence all 
along, considering that it believed itself asked to ―establish an entirely new 
precedent in a Court of Common Law.‖128 
Similarly, all agreed that the cases in the Ecclesiastical and Prerogative 
Courts, where judges sat as fact-finders and often employed different 
evidence rules, were not precedent for common law courts sitting with a jury.  
The rules of evidence in the Ecclesiastical Courts were different because the 
judges were fact-finders ―and [could] exercise a discretion, in admitting or 
rejecting evidence, which would be dangerous where the fact is tried by a 
jury.‖129  In cases where similar letters had been admitted in those courts, they 
―would have been clearly inadmissible in a Court of Common Law.‖130  At the 
end of day, the only cases that could support a precedent were those of the 
common law courts, and the fact that none were cited in the tortuous history 
of the case was not lost on the House of Lords when it affirmed the letters‘ 
exclusion: 
[I]t is a circumstance of no small weight in determining my 
opinion . . . , that, with all the industry and ability of the 
learned Counsel for the defendants below, no single instance 
has been adduced of evidence of this kind having been 
admitted in a Court of Common Law.  When I reflect upon 
the frequent occurrence of questions of this kind, and I must 
add, the probable existence of such proof in favour of 
 
126. Id. 
127. See id. at 506.  Judge Coltman speaks of the general rule requiring proof by the 
examination of witnesses upon oath subject to cross examination, which places a duty on a party 
seeking to do otherwise to ―shew some recognised exception to the general rule.‖  Id. 
128. Id. at 514 (Bosanquet, J.). 
129. Id. at 501 (Sir Cresswell, arguing for Tatham); id. at 512 (Bosanquet, J.); id. at 521 
(Tindall, J.). 
130. Id. at 502 (Sir Cresswell, arguing for Tatham); id. at 512 (Bosanquet, J.); id. at 521 
(Tindall, J.). 
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competency, I cannot account for its absence, except upon the 
supposition that it has been assumed and considered to be 
inadmissible for the purpose for which the evidence was upon 
the present occasion tendered.
131
 
 The Wright judges took pains to avoid making new law or disguising new 
law as part of the old.  That attitude makes the case an especially good 
indicator of the state of the preexisting law, however poor an exemplar it is of 
dynamic common law evolution.  The preexisting law, against which the 
Founders would have framed the Confrontation Clause, included nonassertive 
conduct within its conception of hearsay evidence.  Such evidence was 
inadmissible without specific exception, of which none applied, leaving 
counsel to urge (unsuccessfully) a previously unrecognized reduction in the 
hearsay rule‘s scope.132 
Consequently, suggestions that the Wright case made a mess of an earlier 
hearsay conception consistent with the assertion-based view are either 
anachronisms or perhaps wishful thinking among those who prefer the 
assertion-based view.  For example, the court in Stoddard v. State
133
 suggested 
an ―earlier, and essentially indistinguishable, common law counterpart[]‖ to 
the Federal Rules‘ assertion-centered definition of hearsay that created a 
―well-marked boundary between . . . clean-cut paradigms of hearsay and non-
hearsay,‖ but which lasted only until the Wright court disrupted the heretofore 
―ship shape‖ hearsay rule with its ―caveat‖ of implied assertions.134  But the 
court failed to offer even the slightest historical evidence for the existence of 
such halcyon days before Wright.  Instead, it relied on Professor Mueller‘s 
observation that to use the term ―implied assertion‖ to refer to what a 
declarant‘s conduct suggests, rather than what it is intended to convey, 
―divorces ‗assertion‘ from normal usage, making it mean essentially 
‗evidence‘ and severing it from expressive or communicative purpose.‖135 
 
131. Wright v. Tatham, (1838) 7 Eng. Rep. 559, 570 (H.L.) (Williams, J.). 
132. Maguire, supra note 114, at 752–53. 
As a general exclusive principle, the hearsay rule was solidly established.  The 
foundations of the main exceptions admitting some assertive hearsay had also 
been laid.  Those exceptions certainly did not include anything covering the 
needs of the litigant offering the letters in the immediate situation, nor does 
there appear in the long and varied discussion much special urging to fabricate a 
new hearsay exception.  Argument of counsel and judges can on the whole be 
most easily referred to as effort for and against restricting definition of the 
exclusionary rule‘s scope. 
Id. (discussing the Wright case). 
133. 850 A.2d 406 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), rev‟d, 887 A.2d 564 (Md. 2005). 
134. Id. at 412. 
135. Mueller, supra note 32, at 419 n.153. 
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Although true, Professor Mueller‘s observation hardly provides support 
for the proposition that the hearsay definition existing at the Founding used 
the term ―assertion‖ in the way in which we may use it today, nor is there any 
evidence that he intended his observation as a historical argument.  Professor 
Mueller was simply making a point about what he—like other assertion-
centered proponents—sees as the overbreadth of Wright‘s conception of 
hearsay and the unfortunate locution declarant-centered proponents use when 
trying to show their position consistent with the language of Federal Rule 
801(c).
136
  Baron Parke‘s Wright opinion refers to implied statements, not 
implied assertions, making no pretense that its holding was consistent with an 
assertion-centered view.
137
 
Moreover, recent studies of evidence law existing at the Founding agree 
that the prevailing definitions of hearsay did not even include the phrase 
―truth of the matter,‖ much less the phrase ―truth of the matter asserted.‖138  
They referred more generally to all unsworn, out-of-court statements.
139
  To 
this definition, the contemporary, commonly used evidence sources added the 
lack of cross-examination as a rationale.
140
  It is that rationale which the 
Supreme Court holds limits the Confrontation Clause to out-of-court 
statements by persons whose cross-examination is useful because their 
credibility is implicated, i.e., when their statements are offered for the truth of 
the matter asserted.
141
  If hearsay‘s contemporaneous formal Founding 
definition did not even limit hearsay statements to those offered for the ―truth 
of the matter,‖ then it surely does not follow that it further limited hearsay 
 
136. Id. 
137. Wright v. Tatham, (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 488, 516–17 (Exch. Div.) (Parke, B.). 
[P]roof of a particular fact . . . which is relevant only as implying a statement or 
opinion of a third person . . . [is] inadmissible in all cases where such a 
statement or opinion not on oath would be of itself inadmissible; and, therefore, 
. . . the letters which are offered only to prove the competence of the testator, 
that is the truth of the implied statements therein contained, were properly 
rejected. 
Id. 
138. Stephen Aslett, Comment, Crawford‟s Curious Dictum: Why Testimonial „Non-Hearsay‟ 
Implicates the Confrontation Clause, 82 TUL. L. REV. 297, 311–22 (2008); Thomas Y. Davies, Not 
“The Framers‟ Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the 
Crawford–Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 
J.L. & POL‘Y 349, 351 n.9, 462 n.279 (2007). 
139. Davies, supra note 138; Aslett, supra note 138, at 312 (citing Thomas Y. Davies, 
Revisiting the Fictional Originalism in Crawford‟s “Cross-Examination Rule: A Reply to Mr. Kry, 72 
BROOK. L. REV. 557, 561–62 n.15 (2007); Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and 
When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 
196 (2005)). 
140. Aslett, supra note 138, at 313 n.83. 
141. Id. at 311–22. 
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only to the truth of matters that a declarant had intentionally asserted.  
Finally, there was nothing about the term ―statement‖ in that hearsay 
definition that showed a choice to avoid using it as the Wright court did, 
namely to include actions that effectively ―make a statement‖ about an actor‘s 
beliefs, even if the actor did not intend to communicate them. 
In fact, one commentator has gone so far as to suggest that a historically 
accurate definition of hearsay requires post-Crawford courts to demand 
confrontation of all testimonial statements made out of court, even if they are 
not hearsay under any modern definition because they are not offered for their 
truth.
142
  That approach would include nonassertive hearsay whose inclusion 
this Article urges.  But it would also go further and encompass statements that 
do not implicate a declarant‘s credibility, such as a murder victim‘s report to 
police that the defendant was dealing drugs, when offered only to show that 
the defendant knew that the victim was accusing him, and thus had motive for 
murder, rather than to show that the defendant had been dealing drugs.
143
  
Nothing in this Article‘s analysis supports that result, which demands 
confrontation even when the missed opportunity to cross-examine has no 
bearing on the statement‘s probative value because its relevance depends only 
 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 303.  Aslett argues that the defendant in such a case is prejudiced because he must 
disprove the allegation (and hence the strength of the motive) by evidence besides the victim‘s cross-
examination, and that ―the jury could still be convinced that the false accusation itself was enough‖ 
to provide a motive to kill ―if the false accusation caused negative consequences.‖  Id. at 302–03.  
The argument proves too much.  It is precisely because even a false accusation can give motive for 
murder that hearsay theory calls the victim‘s credibility not probative when the allegation is offered 
merely for the fact that it was known to the defendant, and not to show the defendant‘s involvement 
in drug dealing.  There is no drug dealing established by the statement to disprove by cross-
examination or otherwise.  If the prosecution does introduce the evidence to show the defendant‘s 
drug dealing, and hence a more specific and powerful reason to fear the accusation and to kill to 
eliminate it, then confrontation is required because the evidence is being offered for the truth.  If the 
prosecution does not offer the evidence for the truth, then it is limited to arguing whatever motive 
can be inferred from the victim‘s accusation, whether a ridiculous lie or the gospel truth, and the 
defendant is limited to showing that the allegation—true or false—was unknown to him or unlikely 
to cause him harm.  Aslett betrays his allegiance to the ―truth of the matter asserted‖ conception by 
choosing an example of testimonial non-hearsay that he can claim implicates the declarants‘ 
credibility only because juries will use it wrongly.  His other example is that of testimonial 
statements on whose truth experts rely when rendering their opinions, but which juries are told to use 
only for the non-hearsay purpose of evaluating the basis for the expert‘s opinion, and not directly for 
the truth of their contents.  One need not reject the ―truth of the matter‖ formulation to find that the 
testimony of an expert whose opinion presupposes the truth of the testimonial statements is enough to 
trigger the confrontation right.  See, e.g., People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 732–33 (N.Y. 2005) 
(experts‘ reliance on testimonial hearsay statements for their truth triggers defendant‘s confrontation 
right because evaluating the expert‘s opinion requires ―accepting as a premise . . . that the statements 
were true,‖ so ―[t]he distinction between a statement offered for its truth and a statement offered to 
shed light on an expert‘s opinion is not meaningful in this context‖). 
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upon whether it was spoken.
144
  Surely more than a general definition that 
historically did not expressly state the ―truth of the matter‖ limitation, but 
which did incorporate the absence of cross-examination rationale, is required 
before reaching that result.  None of the articles showing the absence of the 
―truth of matter asserted‖ language in the hearsay definition cite cases in 
which courts included out-of-court statements not offered for their truth 
within the ambit of hearsay, and consequently excluded the statements or 
demanded the declarants‘ confrontation.  In contrast, Wright‘s holding is an 
express statement of the common law‘s inclusion of nonassertive conduct 
within the ambit of hearsay and constitutes a landmark precedent for 
consequently excluding it at trial.  Thus, all the historical indications support 
extending the confrontation right at least far enough to encompass the 
testimonial, nonassertive conduct whose exclusion we can be certain the 
common law courts required. 
IV.  A PROPOSAL FOR INCORPORATING THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFINITION OF 
HEARSAY 
Constitutionally mandating the declarant-centered definition of hearsay 
for confrontation purposes need not be disruptive.  Rather than provide two 
different definitions of hearsay, one for testimonial hearsay offered against 
criminal defendants and another for all other situations, courts and legislatures 
in all jurisdictions can simply revert to the original common law definition 
encompassing nonassertive conduct.  Each jurisdiction can then choose 
whether to enact a hearsay exception for nonassertive conduct, which would 
not allow admission of testimonial, nonassertive conduct without 
confrontation.  This proposal would simply require courts to do with 
nonassertive conduct what they are already doing with all other hearsay—that 
is, base the confrontation right on whether the hearsay is testimonial, without 
regard for whether an applicable hearsay exception applies.  Recasting 
 
144. For example, eliminating the truth of the matter asserted requirement would demand 
confrontation even if the victim‘s accusation were offered merely to prove that he was able to speak 
and thus alive when he reported the defendant‘s drug activities to the police.  Aslett seems to avoid 
this result by limiting his example to one where he assumes that a jury would use the evidence for its 
forbidden hearsay inference, although it is also relevant for a non-hearsay purpose.  The real test of 
Aslett‘s thesis is whether the Confrontation Clause is offended when the lack of confrontation 
potentially impedes the defendant‘s ability to rebut evidence that is correctly used for its non-hearsay 
purpose.  For example, does the Confrontation Clause prohibit using the unsworn, uncross-examined 
accusation to prove that the accuser was alive before the defendant allegedly killed him because he is 
not available to the defense to contradict the proof?  Does it prohibit using the victim‘s accusations 
against the defendant, regardless of their truth, to show the defendant‘s motive to kill because the 
victim is not available to the defendant to deny that he ever made the threats?  Although it is 
undoubtedly true that the definition of hearsay was less than fully developed at the Founding, it 
seems unlikely that the oath and cross-examination rationales were so far divorced from the concern 
for witness credibility. 
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nonassertive conduct as a hearsay exception would prevent courts from 
confusing its exclusion by post-Founding hearsay definitions with its 
constitutionally required inclusion under the Confrontation Clause.  A 
uniform definition of hearsay would remind courts to protect defendants‘ right 
to confront testimonial, nonassertive conduct and the testimonial, intended 
assertions defined as hearsay by the Federal Rules. 
In contrast, accomplishing that goal will be elusive in a regime in which 
the declarant-centered definition of hearsay applies to testimonial statements 
offered against criminal defendants, while the assertion-centered definition, 
which excludes nonassertive conduct, applies in all other circumstances.  
First, the belief that the hearsay definition reflects a single, correct conceptual 
structure rather than a historically contingent one reflecting different policy 
choices equivalent to those informing hearsay exceptions will undoubtedly 
persist.  As shown by the cases in Part II, there is a persistent, though 
incorrect, association between non-hearsay under Federal Rule 801(c) and 
statements that are not offered for the truth of any matter and thus do not 
implicate the declarant‘s credibility.145  That association has outlasted the 
Federal Rules by more than thirty years and will continue to encourage courts 
to think that the assertion-centered definition with which they are familiar 
applies across the board.
146
 
More critically, nonassertive conduct can easily be overlooked as hearsay, 
a fact that plays no small role in some commentators‘ arguments for excluding 
it from the statutory definition.
147
  But where there is no option to exclude it 
because the Confrontation Clause demands the declarant-centered definition, 
realizing the constitutional goal requires a doctrine that will help lawyers and 
judges recognize nonassertive hearsay.  Doing so requires practice, and the 
easiest way to encourage courts and lawyers to practice is by changing the 
statutory definition of hearsay to track the constitutional definition.  
Jurisdictions that currently exclude nonassertive conduct from hearsay can 
then create a hearsay exception for nonassertive conduct, while those that 
retained the traditional declarant-centered view need not.
148
  Instead of 
employing the constitutional definition in only the relatively few cases where 
prosecutors offer testimonial, nonassertive conduct, courts and lawyers will 
use it all the time, while also becoming familiar with a hearsay exception that, 
 
145. See supra notes 38–45 and accompanying text. 
146. One might say that the incorrect assumption of a single definition sparked the need for this 
Article. 
147. Park, supra note 14, at 791. 
148. Compare FED. R. EVID. 801(c), which would require an exception, with TEX. R. EVID. 
801(c), which would not. 
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in most jurisdictions, will allow the proof except when the Confrontation 
Clause applies. 
The proposal uses the bias in favor of a single definition to capture all the 
hearsay whose identification the Constitution demands.  It requires lawyers 
and courts routinely to exercise the ―muscles‖ necessary to identify all 
hearsay requiring confrontation.  It also requires them to learn the exception 
for nonassertive conduct, pursuant to which such conduct will be admissible 
in cases where the Confrontation Clause does not apply.  Encountering a case 
when the prosecution offers potentially testimonial, nonassertive conduct, 
courts and defense lawyers will recognize it as hearsay and realize—as they 
do now for assertion-centered hearsay—that the statement‘s testimonial 
quality, not its qualification under a hearsay exception, determines 
admissibility without confrontation.  Courts and lawyers will be far less likely 
to spot testimonial, nonassertive hearsay under a regime that defines it as 
hearsay pursuant to a rarely used rule that applies only when the prosecution 
offers such evidence against criminal defendants. 
Moreover, there is an important collateral benefit to changing the hearsay 
definition even in those cases where confrontation is not an issue.  In most 
jurisdictions, nonassertive conduct will be admissible pursuant to a hearsay 
exception rather than excluded by the basic hearsay definition.  Admitting 
nonassertive conduct under a hearsay exception recognizes that the person 
engaging in that conduct is a hearsay declarant whose credibility can be 
attacked and supported as if he were a witness.
149
   
Admission of persons‘ nonassertive conduct makes their credibility 
relevant, like that of any hearsay declarant under the assertion-centered 
definition, so there can be no argument against this result.  That the Federal 
Rules allow impeachment of statements admitted under hearsay exceptions 
justified by reduced hearsay dangers, but deny impeachment of nonassertive 
conduct admitted pursuant to a narrowed hearsay definition that is also 
justified by reduced hearsay dangers, has always been an anomaly leading to 
arbitrary and indefensible results.
150
  For example, in United States v. Garcia-
Villanueva, the court held that a criminal defendant, whose out-of-court 
statements telling her alleged accomplices not to smuggle aliens had been 
admitted to show her noninvolvement, should have been declared immune 
from impeachment.
151
  The court reasoned that the defendant could not be 
 
149. FED. R. EVID. 806. 
150. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 972–73 
(1974).  Professor Tribe argues that reduced, but not eliminated, hearsay dangers associated with 
nonassertive conduct justifies, at most, creating a hearsay exception that admits nonassertive conduct 
while allowing its impeachment pursuant to Federal Rule 806. 
151. 855 F.2d 863, No. 87-5261, 1988 WL 86215, at *1–3 (9th Cir. 1988).  
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impeached because her statements were ―verbal conduct‖ providing 
circumstantial evidence of state of mind, which is not hearsay under Federal 
Rule 801, rather than hearsay statements asserting her state of mind, which is 
hearsay under Federal Rule 801, but admissible pursuant to Federal Rule 
803(3)‘s state of mind exception.  Either way, however, her credibility was 
implicated; the probative value of the proof as evidence of her desire that she 
not be involved depended entirely upon whether she meant for her 
accomplices to refrain from smuggling (sincerity) and the accuracy with 
which her words reported her attitude about her own, rather than the others‘, 
involvement (narration or ambiguity). 
The proposal avoids the possibility that courts would disallow 
impeachment of nonassertive conduct altogether because it does not qualify as 
hearsay.  That result unjustifiably exempts nonassertive conduct from 
impeachment, although its probative value depends on the declarant‘s 
credibility.  Worse, such a result would compound the injury to defendants 
who are denied the opportunity to impeach the persons whose nonassertive 
conduct they also are not able to confront.  (Thus, for example, none of the 
defendants in the cases discussed in Part II would have been allowed to 
impeach the absent declarants as if they were witnesses.)  Consequently, the 
defendants cannot introduce the declarants‘ inconsistent statements unless 
another hearsay exception applies.
152
  Nor can they show that the declarants 
were convicted of perjury, are biased against the defendant, or suffer from 
memory loss.
153
  Such a result is indefensible and, with respect to the bias 
evidence, may even be unconstitutional.
154
  Changing the statutory definition 
to include nonassertive conduct while creating a hearsay exception for such 
conduct will assure that courts will allow impeachment of those declarants.  
This result benefits fact-finding in all cases and avoids the ―double whammy‖ 
under current law when defendants can neither confront nor impeach 
testimonial, nonassertive conduct. 
V.  PROTECTING THE CONFRONTATION RIGHT FROM EVISCERATION BY 
EVIDENCE JUSTIFYING INVESTIGATORS‘ BEHAVIOR 
Extending the confrontation right to testimonial, nonassertive conduct will 
have little or no effect unless courts protect it from routine evasion by 
prosecutors claiming to introduce testimonial hearsay only for its effect on the 
listener and not for the truth of the matter asserted to explain investigators‘ 
actions that defendants have not questioned.  By arguing that investigators 
 
152. FED. R. EVID. 613. 
153. See FED. R. EVID. 609; see also United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50 (1984). 
154. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (the Sixth Amendment right to confront 
witnesses includes the right to show a witness‘s bias against a defendant).  
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took the steps they did because they observed or otherwise learned of the 
testimonial hearsay, prosecutors have been able to introduce such evidence 
with alarming frequency, leaving a misleading limiting instruction the 
defendant‘s only possible protection.155  Without a clear constitutional 
mandate to avoid this result, courts are rendering the Confrontation Clause‘s 
protection against unconfronted, testimonial hearsay illusory.  Although this 
problem encompasses all testimonial hearsay, it is particularly acute for 
nonassertive conduct.  An instruction that tells the jury not to use nonassertive 
conduct for the truth of the matter asserted is particularly misleading, if not 
incoherent, because nonassertive conduct is not offered to prove anything that 
 
155. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 560 F.3d 754, 764–65 (8th Cir. 2009) (evidence that the 
victim said he knew the person who shot him and his accomplice as ―Clean‖ and ―Charmar‖ was 
admitted to show why the officer searched a database for those names and found an incident report 
linking the defendants and providing their full names); United States v. Pugh, 273 F. App‘x 449, 455 
(6th Cir. 2008) (testimony that the officer was given the defendant‘s name as a suspect was 
admissible to show why he investigated him); Decay v. State, No. CR 08-1259, 2009 WL 3785695 
(Ark. Nov. 12, 2009) (court admitted the detective‘s testimony that ―an individual that told us that 
Mr. Decay told him that he committed the murders‖ to explain ―why Decay was not arrested on April 
4, 2007, but was arrested on April 6, 2007‖) (internal quotation marks omitted); People v. Varnado, 
Nos. B188489, B194298, B195683, 2007 WL 3025083 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2007) (inculpatory 
eyewitness identifications were admissible to explain why the officer included the defendants‘ 
pictures in a photo array); State v. Barney, 185 P.3d 277, 279 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (evidence of an 
anonymous call to police describing a person going to doors and peeking in windows in a certain 
neighborhood was admitted ―to explain the officers‘ actions after receiving the dispatch‖ and ―how 
the officer initially approached Barney as a suspect‖); Commonwealth v. Pelletier, 879 N.E.2d 125, 
130 (Mass. Ct. App. 2008) (the victims‘ statements to police were offered to provide context for the 
police investigation); People v. Hall, 861 N.Y.S.2d 889, 890–91 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (testimony 
that a police officer told the defendant that his mother had not corroborated his alibi was admitted ―to 
explain why the defendant confessed to the police when he did,‖ although the court did not say why 
the timing of the defendant‘s confession was relevant and declined to decide whether the prosecutor 
used the testimony improperly because the contention was ―not preserved for our review‖) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted); State v. James, 158 P.3d 102, 109–10 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) 
(evidence of statements by anonymous informants was admitted to ―recount[] the course of the 
investigation to explain why the investigation was in the . . . neighborhood‖ and to ―connect to‖ 
testifying witnesses‘ claims that they also heard multiple shots);  cf. State v. Simmons, 233 S.W.3d 
235, 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (police officer‘s testimony about the victim‘s description of the details 
of her sexual abuse, ―including where episodes occurred, what sex acts transpired and how Daughter 
and Defendant cleaned up, afterwards,‖ was admissible to show motivation behind the investigation 
and to explain the ―Daughter‘s examination at the emergency room and the seizure and testing of 
washcloths found in Defendant‘s home‖; court discussed hearsay but not the confrontation issue 
because an accomplice testified at trial); People v. Carney, 795 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2005) (court admitted testimony concerning a 911 call made by a non-testifying declarant ―as 
background information explaining why the police took a series of investigatory actions‖); United 
States v. Burchard, No. 5:07-Cr-9, 2007 WL 1894257 (W.D. Ky. Jun. 29, 2007) (prosecution may 
offer officers‘ testimony about declarants‘ allegations that the defendant used and sold drugs to 
explain why the defendant was investigated and searched for committing those crimes);  
Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1017 (Pa. 2007) (trooper‘s testimony that defendant‘s 
accomplice gave an alibi that conflicted with the defendant‘s was admissible ―to explain the 
justification for further investigating [them]‖; court discussed hearsay but not the confrontation issue 
because an accomplice testified at trial). 
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the declarant explicitly or implicitly intends to assert.  Thus, clarifying the 
hearsay inferences arising from nonassertive conduct creates a propitious 
opportunity also to consider the very limited circumstances under which true 
non-hearsay use of testimonial statements avoids implicating the 
Confrontation Clause. 
As an example, consider the following scenario.
156
  The courts in all of the 
cases discussed in Part II see the light and hold that testimonial, nonassertive 
conduct triggers the confrontation right.  Without producing the declarants, 
the prosecution nonetheless calls the officers who heard the declarants‘ 
inculpatory statements to testify about those statements, which admittedly 
require confrontation if offered for their truth.  But when the defendants 
object, the prosecutors claim that they are offering the statements only to 
explain why the officers, having heard the inculpatory statements, decided to 
take (or forego) some subsequent investigative step, and not for the truth of 
any matters asserted by the declarants.
157
  The court admits the evidence as 
background evidence to show the course of the investigation, although the 
defendants have not made an issue of why the officers acted as they did.  The 
court then instructs the jury to consider inferences from the fact that the 
declarants uttered the statements to investigators, but not to consider 
inferences that rely on the truth of matters asserted by the declarants.  
Unbeknownst to the jury, it is trapped in a dilemma that is not of its own 
making: It can ignore the statements entirely, because there is no issue to 
which they are relevant for their permissible, non-hearsay purpose, or it can 
 
156. The scenario is adapted from Pelletier, 879 N.E.2d at 130, where the court, although 
entertaining serious doubts about whether Crawford exempts testimonial, nonassertive conduct, 
nonetheless found that such conduct did not require confrontation when offered ―to set [] the context 
for the police investigation.‖  See also People v. Salido, No. B186643, 2007 WL 2325810, at *6 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2007) (accomplice‘s false alibi for the defendant that linked the defendant to the 
accomplice was admissible when offered to explain why officers contacted defendant). 
157. The usual limiting instruction is inapt when applied to nonassertive conduct since the 
declarant‘s beliefs for which it is offered are unintentionally revealed rather than intentionally 
asserted.  For example, the instruction does not convey that the jury is prohibited from using a 
declarant‘s statement falsely exculpating the defendant as evidence that the declarant has knowledge 
of the defendant‘s guilt.  See supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text.  Courts have even 
erroneously held a limiting instruction unnecessary when a declarant‘s false exculpatory statement is 
offered to show the declarant‘s knowledge of the defendant‘s guilt.  United States v. Trala, 86 F.3d 
536, 544–45 (3d. Cir. 2004) (cautioning the jury against considering the truthfulness of the 
declarant‘s statements was unnecessary since they were obviously false and admitted to establish that 
the declarant was lying to the police about the source of the money in the defendant‘s car).  
Similarly, the instruction does not convey that the jury is prohibited from using the declarant‘s act of 
looking for the defendant at a place where drugs are sold as proof that the defendant frequents that 
location.  See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.  A coherent instruction would say that the 
jury is prohibited from using the declarant‘s statements as proof of anything that the declarant 
believes.  The proper instruction makes clear that the evidence has no permissible purpose 
whatsoever unless the defendant has questioned the propriety of the investigation. 
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consider them for their impermissible hearsay purpose in violation of the 
defendants‘ confrontation rights.  Misled by the court‘s limiting instruction 
into believing that there is a permissible use for the evidence, the jury uses it 
improperly. 
The scenario described above is entirely avoidable if courts recognize that, 
unless the defense raises one, no issue exists as to why the police may have 
acted as they did or why the investigation developed as it did to which the 
testimonial hearsay is relevant if used for its non-hearsay inference.  Judge 
Easterbrook crystallized the essential problem with the reasoning of courts 
who consider such testimony relevant despite the defense by noting that 
―every time a person says to the police ‗X committed the crime‘ the statement 
(including all corroborating details) would be admissible to show why the 
police investigated X.‖158  Sanctioning that rubric ―would eviscerate the 
constitutional right to confront and cross-examine one‘s accusers.‖159  Out-of-
court statements admitted for their effect on the police to explain why they 
acted as they did are relevant only when the defendant argues that, for 
example, the officers were ―officious intermeddlers staking out [the 
defendant] for nefarious purposes.‖160  When such an argument is not made, 
however, that type of testimony is not relevant.
161
  Meanwhile, other courts 
have also recognized that ―[a]llowing agents to narrate the course of their 
investigations, and thus spread before juries damning information that is not 
subject to cross-examination, would go far toward abrogating the defendant‘s 
rights under the Sixth Amendment and the hearsay rule.‖162 
Nonetheless, many courts continue to hold that there is no error in 
routinely admitting such evidence as long as juries are told not to consider the 
evidence for its truth.  For example, in Davis v. State,
163
 the Texas Court of 
Appeals held that permitting a detective to testify to the substance of 
anonymous tips inculpating the defendant was not error.
164
  The court found 
that the statements had not been admitted for their truth, but rather to put the 
investigation into ―context.‖165  The court expressly rejected the defendant‘s 
proposal that the court ―limit testimony for this purpose to situations where 
the defendant challenges the investigation as being motivated by vendetta or 
 
158. United States v. Silva, 380 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 2004). 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 1020; see also United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004); Sanabria v. 
State, 974 A.2d 107, 118–19 (Del. 2009); State v. Johnson, No. 34539-1-II, 2007 WL 1417312, at *4 
(Wash. App. Div. May 15, 2007).  
163. 169 S.W.3d 673 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005).  
164. Id. at 676. 
165. Id.   
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grudge.‖166  Tellingly, the court provided no explanation as to how this 
context testimony is otherwise relevant.  Instead, it simply denied that there 
could be error because statements not offered for their truth are not hearsay. 
Instructions about limited admissibility cannot be expected to prevent 
evidence‘s impermissible use when, contrary to the court‘s instruction, the 
proof has no permissible use at all.  Indeed, many courts‘ persistent admission 
of context evidence to explain the course of the investigation by police, 
despite the defendant doing nothing to dispute the conduct of the 
investigation, makes the point.  How can we expect the jury to disregard the 
proof entirely when courts themselves fail to appreciate its irrelevance in that 
circumstance? 
The persistent, though erroneous, assumption of relevancy seemingly rests 
on two possibilities.  First, one can see the evidence as relevant because a 
criminal prosecution reflects a judgment by police or prosecutors that the 
defendant is guilty.  Consequently, every investigative step taken or foregone, 
despite whether it results in admissible evidence, is relevant to evaluating 
whether the prosecution‘s conclusion is justified.  Second, the evidence‘s 
relevance can be defended as a preemptive strike against a misleading 
inference that might flow from the prohibition on the prosecution, in the first 
instance, from ―provid[ing] some explanation for [investigators‘] presence 
and conduct.‖167  Presumably, the feared inference is that mentioned by Judge 
Easterbrook—the police were acting without justification—a conclusion that 
the jury may draw if prosecutors cannot prove why the police behaved as they 
did. 
The first conception is so obviously improper that one will not find courts 
explicitly defending it.  The law is clear that juries are to find facts by 
evaluating for themselves the strength of the evidence that is admitted at trial 
and are not to abdicate their responsibility by evaluating the reasonableness of 
the conclusion of guilt implicit in the prosecution‘s bringing the case to trial. 
Whatever the limits of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
168
 may 
prove to be, only a sea change in Anglo-American evidence law would permit 
 
166. Id.  
167. See United States v. Levine, 378 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875 (E.D. Ark. 2005). 
168. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), its progeny, and the 
amended Federal Rule 702 that it spawned, govern the admissibility of expert testimony.  In United 
States v. Johnson, the court held that when experts provide opinion testimony that relies on hearsay, 
the prosecution should be prevented from eliciting the contents of the statements, even though they 
may bear on the reasonableness of the expert‘s conclusion.  587 F.3d 625, 635 (4th Cir. 2009).  It 
noted how important it is ―that district courts recognize the risk that a particular expert might become 
nothing more than a transmitter of testimonial hearsay and exercise their discretion in a manner to 
avoid such abuses.‖  Id.  The Johnson court‘s attitude toward evidence admissible only to show the 
basis of an expert‘s opinion bears contrast with the courts‘ attitude toward evidence admissible only 
to show background discussed in this Article.  In Johnson, the court protected the defendant‘s 
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investigators to give expert testimony containing their opinion of the 
defendant‘s guilt; such an approach would render the entire investigation 
admissible to allow the jury to evaluate the basis for the investigators‘ 
conclusions.  Moreover, we ask jurors in criminal cases to evaluate the 
strength of evidence admitted at trial, and not to decide whether the 
prosecution acted with sufficient justification.
169
  The latter question is one for 
the court to decide under the rules of criminal procedure.  Standard jury 
instructions telling jurors not to consider law enforcement techniques are 
intended to dissuade them from deciding whether they think that the 
prosecution, given its conduct, deserves a conviction, rather than whether the 
proof, however produced, eliminates a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime.
170
  To put the point more prosaically, our fundamental 
conception of evidence relevant at trial still rests on a firm distinction between 
the first and second half of an episode of the original Law and Order 
television series.  Each episode is divided into the story of the police 
 
confrontation right from exposure to testimonial hearsay statements despite their relevance as a 
foundation for the expert‘s opinion and the possibility of a limiting instruction. In many cases 
discussed in this Article, the courts routinely exposed the defendants‘ confrontation right to 
testimonial hearsay statements, despite their inadmissibility as proof of the crimes charged, by 
claiming that a limiting instruction was sufficient. 
169. There are rare exceptions.  Watson v. State provides a good example.  8 So. 3d 901 (Miss. 
Ct. App. 2008).  In Watson, the defendant was charged with feloniously fleeing a law enforcement 
officer in a motor vehicle pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-9-72(2) (2006).  One of the 
elements of that crime requires the pursuing officer to have ―reasonable suspicion to believe the 
driver in question has committed a crime.‖  MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-72-(1); see also Watson, 8 
So. 3d at 904.  Thus, it was necessary that the Watson court admit an out-of-court statement made to 
the officer accusing the defendant of shoplifting to explain his reason for giving pursuit.  The court 
instructed the jury to use the statement to explain the officer‘s conduct, but not to use it for the truth 
of the matter asserted.  Watson, 8 So. 3d at 903.  The rare exception for when a specific statute makes 
the basis for investigators‘ actions an element of the crime proves the rule that an out-of-court 
statement providing such a basis is not otherwise relevant. 
170. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a); United States v. Torres-Castro, 374 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1008 
(2005); see also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 387 (1964) (admissibility of evidence is a question 
only for the judge, while the credibility or weight of evidence is for the jury; since the voluntariness 
of a confession bears on both, unlike the issues of probable cause, consent to search, and the issuance 
of Miranda warnings, the voluntariness of a confession can be litigated before the jury after the judge 
finds it voluntary); United States v. Arbolaez, 450 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that a 
―defendant alleging a Miranda violation is entitled to a determination outside the presence of the 
jury‖); United States v. Collins, 439 F.2d 610, 614 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (―[W]hether a particular set 
of facts gives rise to a probable cause basis for the belief that a suspect has performed criminal acts is 
a question of law to be determined by the court outside the presence of the jury.‖); Simmons v. 
United States, 206 F.2d 427, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (noting that the ―issue of probable cause for 
appellant‘s arrest [is] a matter solely for determination by the court‖).  Jury instructions range from a 
general ―law enforcement techniques are not your concern‖ to instructions that specific techniques 
such as searches and wiretaps are lawful if the defendant‘s rights were not violated, that there is no 
alleged violation before the jury, and that the jury‘s views about the use of such techniques are not to 
enter into its deliberations.  4 LEONARD SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—
CRIMINAL §§ 4.01, 5.08 (2005) (Instructions 4-4 and 5-23). 
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investigation (which considers whether the officers‘ suspicions about various 
suspects‘ guilt is justified, and whether their investigation is proper) and the 
story of the trial (which depicts the lawyers‘ presentation of the admissible 
evidence).  We ask the jury to judge the evidence, not the investigation.  If the 
police bungled their way into proof sufficient to show guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the jury should convict no less than if a flawless 
investigation uncovered the same evidence.  Conversely, if the evidence falls 
short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury should acquit regardless of 
whether the case was assembled, and implicitly endorsed, by Sherlock 
Holmes or Inspector Clousseau. 
The second assumption, and one that many courts have explicitly 
defended, is that it is necessary to deviate from the investigation/trial 
distinction at the outset whenever exclusion of otherwise irrelevant evidence 
about the investigation would create a misleading impression that the police 
acted without justification.  This position hypothesizes that despite general 
instructions to focus exclusively on proof of the elements of the crime, juries 
will nonetheless concentrate on whether investigative steps were justified, 
even if defendants do not raise that issue.  Consequently, anything that rebuts 
a potential attack on the investigation‘s integrity is relevant, regardless of 
whether the defendant chooses to launch that attack.  But the argument proves 
far too much. 
First, by admitting evidence relevant only to the investigation‘s integrity, 
courts undermine their attempt to focus the jury‘s attention on the quality of 
the proof.  When courts admit proof relevant only to the investigation‘s 
appropriateness, they turn the prediction that juries will consider the 
justification for investigative steps rather than the quality of the proof, despite 
instruction to the contrary, into a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Also, by admitting 
the evidence before the defendant raises an issue about the investigation‘s 
propriety, courts encourage defendants concerned about the evidence‘s 
accrediting effect to contest the investigators‘ conduct, even if they had not 
otherwise planned to do so, directing the jury‘s attention that much further 
afield.  Most importantly, the courts eliminate any opportunity for the defense 
to prevent the jury from hearing evidence, which, if used at all, violates the 
defendant‘s confrontation right.171  Ironically, courts justify this result by 
hypothesizing that juries will not properly focus their attention on the trial 
 
171. If used directly for the truth of the facts it asserts or indirectly for the truth to show a firm 
foundation for the prosecution‘s belief in the defendant‘s guilt, the evidence violates the defendant‘s 
confrontation rights.  Cf. People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727, 732–33 (N.Y. 2005) (experts‘ reliance 
on testimonial hearsay statements for their truth triggered the defendant‘s confrontation right because 
evaluating the expert‘s opinion required ―accepting as a premise . . . that the statements were true,‖ 
so ―[t]he distinction between a statement offered for its truth and a statement offered to shed light on 
an expert‘s opinion is not meaningful in this context‖). 
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despite instructions to do so, while inconsistently considering a ―not for the 
truth‖ instruction sufficient to cure the Confrontation Clause problem of the 
courts‘ own making.  In effect, courts taking this approach allow the 
prosecution to ―fight fire with fire‖ before the defendant has struck a match.  
In so doing, the jury is needlessly exposed to evidence whose use is 
constitutional error when there is no issue about the investigators‘ conduct.  
There is no justification for this result. 
Perhaps the reason why so many courts routinely allow explanatory 
evidence to prevent juries from possibly inferring government misconduct, 
even when doing so violates defendants‘ confrontation right, is that they have 
become so accustomed to defense counsel making the argument.  It is 
remarkable how often the defense does raise, whether intentionally or not, a 
question about the propriety of the government‘s investigation by pursuing 
themes such as rush to judgment, sloppy or overreaching investigation, or 
round up the usual suspect(s).  Nonetheless, the frequency with which 
defendants may open the door to the proof by suggesting government 
misconduct does not justify admission of the evidence in anticipation.  At 
most, it illustrates how often defendants will choose to suggest impropriety 
when a witness begins her testimony with, say, a statement that she arrived at 
the scene to effect an arrest without her first testifying to the radio call that got 
her there, or that she organized a lineup containing the defendant without her 
first testifying to the tip that focused suspicion on him.  That defendants may 
often choose a route that justifies admission of the radio call or the tip for its 
effect on the officer and not for the truth, however, does not justify 
eliminating the defendant‘s option to prevent admission of the evidence in the 
first place by not questioning the propriety of the arrest or lineup.  Courts 
should welcome that alternative as a first-best solution, fully protective of the 
defendant‘s confrontation right and most likely to concentrate the jury‘s 
attention on what should be its primary focus—the evidence stemming from 
the arrest along with the identification at the lineup.  Indeed, by routinely 
admitting the evidence and justifying its admission by a limiting instruction, 
courts have virtually invited defendants to exacerbate the jury‘s misdirection 
toward the question of whether the prosecution‘s conduct, rather than the 
proof, merits a conviction. 
Allowing prosecutors to enter evidence explaining why the police 
conducted the investigation as they did, courts unnecessarily encourage the 
jury to abandon its proper role of judging the strength of the evidence in favor 
of evaluating the investigation‘s merits and the investigators‘ beliefs.  When 
the defense makes an issue of investigators acting without sufficient basis, the 
confusion of the jury‘s role is unavoidable; the prosecution must be allowed to 
rebut the allegation by showing the basis upon which the investigators acted.  
In this situation, the most we can expect of the court is an instruction trying to 
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refocus the jury‘s attention on the evidence rather than on the investigators‘ 
behavior or beliefs. 
There is no justification, however, for needlessly confusing those roles 
when the defense does not advance such a claim.  It is already a difficult 
enough task to keep the jury focused on the evidence rather than on the 
investigation and the beliefs of the investigators.  As subsequent versions of 
Law and Order show, the investigation is usually far more compelling than 
the trial.  Law and Order: Special Victims Unit and Law and Order: Criminal 
Intent became long-running hits by spending much more time on the 
investigation than on the trial, while Law and Order: Trial by Jury reversed 
that emphasis and lasted only one season.
172
 
To avoid the constitutional violation that is the inevitable consequence of 
needlessly exposing the jury to evidence whose only relevance entails a 
hearsay inference violating the defendant‘s confrontation right, courts should 
hold that it is error to admit testimonial hearsay for its effect on investigators 
unless the defendant has made an issue of their conduct.
173
  Few decided cases 
require that the defendant raise an issue about the investigation before 
admitting such evidence.  In State v. Munoz, for example, the court permitted 
the prosecution to prove that an anonymous caller identified the defendant as 
someone to ―look at‖ in connection with a recently attempted burglary, gave 
his name, age, and physical description, and while speaking with an Hispanic 
accent, identified him as coming from her country.
174
  Before trial, the 
defendant moved to exclude the statements of the anonymous female caller, 
who was not going to testify at trial, on the grounds that introducing her 
 
172. See TV.com, Law & Order: Special Victims Unit on TV.com, http://www.tv.com/law-
and-order-special-victims-unit/show/334/summary.html (last visited May 19, 2010); TV.com, Law & 
Order: Criminal Intent on TV.com, http://www.tv.com/law-and-order-criminal-
intent/show/1381/summary.html (last visited May 19, 2010); TV.com, Law & Order: Trial by Jury 
on TV.com, http://www.tv.com/law-and-order-trial-by-jury/show/25938/summary.html (last visited 
May 19, 2010). 
173. United States v. Silva, 380 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 2004), endorsed this view: ―If a jury 
would not otherwise understand why an investigation targeted a particular defendant, the testimony 
could dispel an accusation that the officers were officious intermeddlers staking out Silva for 
nefarious purposes.  No such argument was made in this case, however, and no other explanation 
was given why the testimony would be relevant.‖  Id. (emphasis added).  Unfortunately, however, 
Silva stopped short of establishing a rule that the evidence‘s admission in that circumstance violates 
the Confrontation Clause, relying instead on an ad hoc determination that ―too much‖ hearsay was 
admitted, and that the trial court failed to give an appropriate limiting instruction or stop the 
prosecutor from making improper use of the proof.  Id. at 1020–21.  While these factors may 
influence whether the constitutional error was harmless, they should not affect whether admission of 
the evidence was error in the first instance.  See also United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 677 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (inconsistently saying that evidence is helpful to the jury only on the issue of guilt where 
there is no dispute about the investigation‘s subjects or reasons for their investigation, and that any 
link between out-of-court statements and investigators‘ actions renders the statements relevant). 
174. 949 A.2d 155, 157 (N.H. 2008).  
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statements would violate his confrontation right.
175
  The prosecution argued 
that they were admissible to show why the police obtained the defendant‘s 
fingerprint card from the United States Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS).
176
  The defendant‘s fingerprint matched one taken from the 
balcony from which the burglar unsuccessfully attempted entry.
177
  The trial 
court denied the defendant‘s motion, finding that since the statements were 
―being offered to show the state of mind of the police,‖ rather than for their 
truth, they were admissible to show why the police contacted the INS and 
investigated the defendant.
178
  On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
found that admission of the testimony was not error because it 
―demonstrate[d] the reasonableness of the police action in contacting the 
INS.‖179  Thus, the Munoz court found it proper to admit the evidence even 
before the defense had a chance to question the investigation and despite 
whether it ever suggested that the police had acted unreasonably.
180
 
Relying on a limiting instruction in that circumstance is unnecessary, 
ineffective, and ultimately unconstitutional.  When there is no permissible 
non-hearsay purpose for the proof, as when there is no allegation of 
impropriety to rebut, the improper use of the evidence to buttress the 
prosecution‘s case is unavoidable.  In the prosecutor‘s opening statement in 
Munoz, for example, he ―used the tip to corroborate the description given by 
[the testifying eyewitness].‖181  How is the jury, then, to understand the 
evidence of the anonymous tip?  The appellate court did not consider whether 
that use of the tip entailed a hearsay use of the proof since the defense counsel 
did not specifically object to the opening statement after losing his motion in 
limine to keep out the description.
182
  But one can hardly blame defense 
counsel. 
According to the Munoz court‘s ruling, anything that might bear on the 
reasonableness of the officers‘ actions—a question it specifically analogized 
to a court‘s determination of probable cause183—was admissible.  The 
 
175. Id. at 159.  
176. Id. at 160. 
177. Id. at 157. 
178. Id. at 160. 
179. Id. at 161. 
180. Indeed, the trial court noted that it was routine to ―put in any kind of anonymous tip that‘s 
called in,‖ as long as it was ―offered to show the state of mind of police‖ bearing on the basis for 
their actions.  Munoz, 949 A.2d at 160 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Barney, 
185 P.3d 277, 280–81 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (deeming the offending proof admissible before trial in a 
hearing on a motion in limine); United States v. Burchard, No. 5:06-Cr-9, 2007 WL 1894257 (W.D. 
Ky. Jun. 29, 2007) (same). 
181. Id. at 161. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
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matching descriptions gave the police reason to credit the tip and therefore 
obtain the defendant‘s fingerprint card.  How was defense counsel supposed 
to divine that the court would suddenly accept that the jury would misuse the 
tip as corroboration supporting the testifying eyewitness‘s identification rather 
than as support for the investigators‘ suspicion that the defendant had 
committed the crime?  And why would the appellate court so anxiously avoid 
the question of whether the prosecutor‘s comment amounted to improper use 
of the tip unless it were plainly apparent that it is unreasonable to expect 
jurors to distinguish information on which they can rely to decide guilt from 
information on which they can rely only to evaluate the investigation, after 
exposing them to the latter without reason?  After all, if the prosecutor‘s 
comment went too far, did that mean that the jury was not supposed to note 
that the descriptions matched, or on its own realize that it was supposed to use 
the corroboration only as proof of an issue that it was not asked to decide (the 
reasonableness of the investigation), while ignoring the corroboration‘s 
obvious value as proof of an issue it was asked to decide (the identity of the 
erstwhile burglar)? 
When the consequence of the evidence‘s use is a constitutional violation 
because the proof is testimonial hearsay, the Confrontation Clause prohibits 
its admission for its effect on investigators merely because jurors might 
consider the propriety of the investigators‘ actions, even when explicitly 
instructed that the investigators‘ actions are not their concern.  The alternative 
allows routine evasion of the Confrontation Clause, while its protections 
evaporate in a nod and wink among prosecutors.  Unfortunately, even those 
courts that are sensitive to this possibility have not clearly stated that 
admission of the proof before defendants question an investigation‘s propriety 
is a constitutional violation.  Instead, they have often sanctioned the lesser 
alternative of ―sanitizing‖ the content of the statements, an expedient which 
guarantees continued abuse of the ―not for the truth‖ path to admission of 
testimonial hearsay.  For example, some courts have allowed investigators to 
testify only to having ―acted ‗upon information received‘ or words to that 
effect,‖ reasoning that the need for evidence explaining actions of the police is 
slight before the defendant challenges them, while the potential for misuse is 
great.
184
  Nonetheless, such an approach still fails to explain how the evidence 
is relevant at all, why a jury focusing on the investigation despite contrary 
instruction will discount proof that the police have information besides that 
admitted at trial, what amounts to proper sanitation, and whether such 
sanitation can be accomplished. 
 
184. United States v. Levine, 378 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875–76 (E.D. Ark. 2005) (citing 
2 MCCORMICK, supra note 26, § 249, at 103). 
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Munoz, again, serves as an example.  Once the trial court indicated that it 
would allow the anonymous call to explain ―why the investigation took the 
turn that it did,‖ the defendant suggested allowing the officer to testify merely 
that the investigation had led police to suspect the defendant.
185
  The trial 
court rejected the suggestion, stating that it would unfairly prejudice the 
defendant by suggesting that the police were aware of his past criminal 
activity.  It then allowed the prosecution, as a less prejudicial alternative, to 
prove the caller‘s suggestion that the police ―look at‖ the defendant in 
connection with the specific burglary for which he was on trial.
186
  The trial 
court was clearly correct to envision that any reference to extrajudicial 
information implicating the defendant in possession of the police, even if 
unspecified, would invariably be used for its truth since nobody questioned 
the propriety of the investigation.  But admitting specific information 
implicating the defendant in the crime for which he was on trial hardly 
improved matters. 
The trial court seemed more concerned with the prospect that the jury 
would use the proof as evidence of other crimes than it was with the prospect 
that the jury would violate the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right by using 
the information either as proof that the defendant had engaged in other crimes 
or as proof of the crime for which the defendant was on trial.  The court was 
correct to think that even a general reference to extrajudicial information 
obtained by the police justifying the investigation would prejudice the 
defendant by inviting the jury to perceive that information as accurately 
implicating the defendant in something, if not this particular crime.  But the 
same argument was at least as powerful for the prejudice resulting from 
admission of the specific information; if the jury would ignore a limiting 
instruction to find proof of other crimes, why would it not ignore a limiting 
instruction to find proof of this one?  How could evidence of no relevance 
possibly justify a constitutional violation?  Remarkably, all we are told is that 
courts ―put in any kind of anonymous tip that‘s called in‖ if ―it‘s being offered 
to show the state of mind of the police,‖187 and that by premising his objection 
 
185. Munoz, 949 A.2d at 160. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Similarly flawed reasoning has caused courts to 
decide whether testimonial hearsay statements offered to explain investigators‘ behavior violate the 
Confrontation Clause by considering how prejudicial they are rather than whether they have any 
relevance for a non-hearsay purpose.  In State v. Barney, the court held that a limit to the 
admissibility of hearsay in this context requires exclusion when the hearsay ―tend[s] to identify the 
accused and establish his guilt.‖  185 P.3d 277, 281–82 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007).  The court nonetheless 
allowed a description of Barney‘s physical attributes, clothing, and activities of peeping into 
windows, approaching doors, and ringing doorbells, finding that ―the testimony did not identify a 
particular individual who had committed a particular crime.‖  Id. at 282.  The analysis confuses the 
question of whether admitting this evidence before the defendant questioned the officers‘ actions 
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only on the Confrontation Clause, defense counsel somehow waived any 
claim that the evidence‘s nonexistent probative value was outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect.
188
 
The Munoz court avoided addressing how the probative value of the proof 
justified its prejudice, but others have attempted to address the problem by 
striking a proper balance.  Those courts have had no success in formulating 
coherent protection for the defendant‘s confrontation rights because they 
erroneously concede that explanatory evidence is relevant in the absence of an 
express or implied challenge to the propriety of the investigators‘ conduct.  
They typically begin by exploring the possibility of excising the content of the 
hearsay statement in favor of having the officer testify merely that he had 
―received information‖ before taking subsequent action.189  But even that 
simple expedient is problematic.  One court prefers it because that court 
 
violated the Confrontation Clause with whether the violation was harmless error.  The Confrontation 
Clause does not only give a defendant the right to confront testimony that a court thinks is 
particularly damning any more than it guarantees only the right to confront testimony that a court 
thinks is unreliable.  Puzzlingly, the Barney court, after noting that it must ―first consider whether the 
evidence is relevant,‖ never discussed why the officers‘ reason for investigating Barney was relevant.  
Id. at 281. 
188. See also United States v. Brown, 560 F.3d 754, 764–65 (8th Cir. 2009).  The court there 
held that a Confrontation Clause objection to evidence that the victim identified the defendants as his 
assailants admitted to explain why an officer searched a database for the defendants‘ names was 
insufficient to preserve a claim on appeal that the purported non-hearsay reason for admission of this 
evidence was a subterfuge to get the victim‘s statement about the defendants in front of the jury.  The 
court held that issue was waived because counsel ―did not argue at trial that the prejudicial effect of 
the evidence outweighed its non-hearsay value.‖  Id.  The holding presupposes that non-hearsay use 
of the evidence made a fact of consequence more likely than it would be without the evidence, i.e., 
was relevant, a position that the court assumed, but never articulated.  The defendant never alleged 
misconduct in the way the police got to the defendants.  Since the court would or could not articulate 
the evidence‘s relevance, it is a hard rule that says that defense counsel, on pain of waiving his 
Confrontation Clause objection, has to play along and pretend it is relevant to argue that its probative 
value is nonetheless outweighed by prejudice. 
189. United States v. Cabriera-Rivera, 583 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 2009) (―[T]he government fails 
to show why the details [of the accomplice‘s] confession were necessary to explain the investigative 
source . . . .  [T]he government could simply have had the officers testify that they discovered the 
evidence based on ‗information received.‘‖); United States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 23 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(officer should have been required to testify that he ―acted on information received‖ rather than 
report that he had been told by [the declarant] that the defendant supplied [the declarant] with drugs); 
United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 677 (6th Cir. 2004) (―[Officer] O‘Brien had merely stated 
that she ‗had information‘ about the Buchanan residence that led her to begin an investigation.  
O‘Brien thus alluded, in the vaguest possible terms, to the statements made to her by a [criminal 
informant]‖); Sanabria v. State, 974 A.2d 107, 112–17 (Del. 2009) (―The trial judge [abused its 
discretion because it] never considered whether that background explanation could have been 
provided by simply referencing that Officer Garcia was acting ‗on information received.‘‖); State v. 
Johnson, No. 34539-1-II, 2007 WL 1417312, at *5 (Wash. App. Div. May 15, 2007) (―It might have 
been sufficient to elicit that the deputies acted on a tip, or that they received information consistent 
with Johnson, without setting forth the details that [the declarant] spoke with a prostitute and 
received a description of a pimp matching Johnson.‖).  
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believes testimony that does ―not itself quote or paraphrase the declarant‘s 
statements‖ even if ―the jury would necessarily infer that the declarant had 
said X‖ does not violate the Confrontation Clause.190  Other courts concede 
that such testimony can violate the Clause, but believe it less likely to tempt 
the jury to rely on the unconfronted hearsay.
191
 
The first argument simply ignores established doctrine holding that 
hearsay proved indirectly is no less objectionable than hearsay proved 
directly.
192
  The second argument falters because the assumption that vague 
references to extrajudicial information are less prejudicial than specific 
information is doubtful at best.  First, as the Munoz court realized, vague 
references to ―investigative information‖ may move the jury to believe that 
the police has evidence of ―other crimes.‖193  Being told that it is hearing 
evidence of what the police knew so it can understand why the investigation 
proceeded as it did, the jury‘s most natural reaction to being denied the 
specifics may be to believe that they concern wrongdoing not directly related 
to the current case.  And even courts that prefer vague references concede that 
investigative background evidence suggesting other crimes is particularly 
problematic.
194
 
Moreover, a concern that jurors will infer misconduct from unexplained 
official actions is hardly dispelled by testimony from officials that they acted 
on unspecified information.  Jurors satisfied that easily can undoubtedly be 
trusted to follow the instructions to focus on the proof of the crimes‘ 
commission, not the legality of the investigators‘ conduct, eliminating the 
need for the proof at all.  In fact, drawing jurors‘ attention to the propriety of 
the investigators‘ conduct by allowing the prosecution to establish that it had 
unspecified information can create the need for more specific proof to dispel 
doubts about whether the information withheld was sufficient to justify the 
subsequent action.  In one case, for example, the court first suggested 
allowing police officers to testify that when they arrested the defendant, they 
were acting ―on a tip‖ and then, apparently on second thought, suggested 
allowing them to say ―that they received information consistent with [the 
 
190. Maher, 454 F.3d at 21. 
191. Id. at 23; Sanabria, 974 A.2d at 114–15; Cromer, 389 F.3d at 677. 
192. United States v. Figueroa, 750 F.2d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Check, 582 
F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1978); see also Cromer, 389 F.3d at 677 (testimony that ―explicitly, albeit not 
directly, informed the jury that someone had implicated [the defendant] in illegal activities‖ 
implicates the Confrontation Clause; the officer testified that the defendant was a subject of the 
investigation); cf. Johnson, 2007 WL 1417312, at *4 (although the officer testified to information 
received from another officer, ―it was clear‖ that the second officer relayed the declarant‘s 
description of the defendant). 
193. State v. Munoz, 949 A.2d 155, 160 (N.H. 2008). 
194. Sanabria, 974 A.2d at 112.  
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defendant].‖195  But if the reason why the police officers acted as they did is 
really an issue, how can one stop short of allowing them to tell the whole 
truth—that an officer received a description of the defendant and his car from 
a prostitute who said he was her pimp?  And if it is not enough of an issue for 
the officer to fully report his reason for stopping the defendant in his car, why 
is it admissible at all?  Meanwhile, holding the specific information 
admissible is, of course, no improvement on the vague reference to 
unspecified wrongdoing.  The same courts that hold references to other crimes 
are particularly prejudicial find similarly damaging statements ―relat[ing] to 
an element of the charged offense.‖196 
Thus, even those courts that have endorsed the ―information received‖ 
alternative have required it only when more specific information is ―not 
necessary‖ to explain the investigator‘s conduct, by which they often seem to 
mean that the specific information has no logical connection at all to 
investigators‘ subsequent conduct.  For example, in one case, the court 
allowed proof that the officers had information about drug use on the premises 
they searched, but not evidence that they were looking for the defendant, 
because it did not affect their subsequent conduct by, for example, explaining 
his arrest or the search of his room.
197
  In another, the court found error where 
evidence purporting to explain an officer‘s actions was unknown to him when 
he acted.
198
  What purports to be a balancing test for excluding insufficiently 
probative or unduly prejudicial hearsay often turns out to be merely a way of 
excluding the details of statements that are not even relevant to explain the 
investigators‘ conduct.199  In many cases, the only consequence will be for 
prosecutors to be more careful about selecting the officer whose actions could 
have been affected by knowledge of the hearsay declarations—for example, 
the arresting officer who can act upon all the information generated by the 
investigation up to that point. 
Meanwhile, the courts weighing evidence that has some logical relevance 
as explanatory proof unwittingly demonstrate that the Confrontation Clause 
problem cannot be balanced away.  One court, for example, purported to find 
the evidence inadmissible ―because it provided the primary evidence relevant‖ 
 
195. Johnson, 2007 WL 1417312, at *5. 
196. Sanabria, 974 A.2d at 112. 
197. Cromer, 389 F.3d at 677. 
198. United States v. Silva, 380 F.3d 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 2004).  
199. See, e.g., United States v. Cabriera-Rivera, 583 F.3d 26, 34–35 (1st Cir. 2009).  In that 
case, the court found (1) that admission of context evidence violated the Confrontation Clause 
because detailed testimony about the amounts that accomplices admitted to receiving in the robbery 
―bore no relevance‖ to the defendant‘s investigation and (2) that one accomplice‘s confession 
provided no investigative leads.  Id. 
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to an element of the charged crime.
200
  But the evidence violated the 
Confrontation Clause if the jury used it for its truth, despite how critical; the 
latter circumstance might affect whether its admission was harmless error or 
whether the court should have dismissed the charge for insufficient proof.  
Meanwhile, believing that more was required to explain the evidence‘s 
exclusion, the court fell back onto claiming that the jury likely misused the 
proof only because the prosecutor did so in his opening statement and closing 
argument.
201
  But given the court‘s concession that the reason why the officers 
arrested the defendant was relevant, the line between using the declarant‘s 
statements to show why ―the deputies conclude[d the defendant] was the 
pimp‖ and why the jury should so conclude was nonexistent.202  Other cases 
purporting to analyze the evidence‘s prejudicial effect often reach a similar 
conclusion: there is insufficient basis to reverse admission of the evidence 
unless there is an additional error, such as omission of a limiting instruction or 
improper use of the evidence by the prosecutor.
203
 
At the end of the day, the balancing test devolves into an ad hoc test 
focused more on the actions of the prosecutor and the trial judge than on the 
conceded impact on the defendant‘s confrontation right of evidence whose 
impermissible inference is the only one relevant to the jury‘s charge.204  It 
gives the prosecution every reason to think that if they ―do it right,‖ they are 
entitled to get before the jury evidence that helped persuade investigators of 
the defendant‘s guilt, even though the jury is not allowed to rely on it for that 
purpose.  However well-intentioned the balancing approach may be, it serves 
mostly to perpetuate the fiction that explanatory evidence is ―surely 
relevant‖205 because it ―arguably provides some assistance to the jury in 
understanding the background of the case.‖206  Indeed, this fiction can assure 
 
200. Sanabria, 974 A.2d at 116; see also Cromer, 389 F.3d at 677 (evidence implicated the 
defendant in a way that went to the heart of the prosecution‘s case); Cabriera-Rivera, 583 F.3d at 35 
(evidence was ―the sole basis for the government‘s argument‖ that the defendant ―went to hide‖ with 
the accomplice because ―[t]hey wanted to have an alibi‖).  
201. State v. Johnson, No. 34539-1-II, 2007 WL 1417312, at *5 (Wash. App. Div. May 15, 
2007). 
202. The court said that ―the prosecutor in this case clearly relied on the descriptions as proof 
that the person described was the pimp,‖ though it described her comments as addressing what led 
the deputies to so conclude, not what should persuade the jury.  Id.  
203. Sanabria, 974 A.2d at 120 (evidence admitted without a limiting instruction); United 
States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 23 (1st Cir. 2006) (spontaneous limiting instruction prevented 
admission of evidence from being plain error); Silva, 380 F.3d at 1020–21 (improper argument and 
no limiting instruction). 
204. Maher, 454 F.3d at 23 (stating that the dividing line is between ―true background to 
explain police conduct‖ and ―an attempt to evade Crawford,‖ and warning the prosecutor against 
―backdoor attempts to get statements by non-testifying confidential informants before the jury‖).  
205. Id. 
206. United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 677 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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that the balancing approach, even as applied by a sympathetic court, can 
perpetuate the error that it purports to alleviate. 
In United States v. Hinson,
207
 for example, the court set out to prevent 
admission of out-of-court statements inadmissible for their truth as 
background or context evidence, unless they were ―necessary to explain the 
government‘s subsequent actions.‖208  It held that allowing a detective to 
testify that she investigated Hinson because she heard that he supplied another 
target with drugs was error.  But the court‘s reasoning unwittingly guaranteed 
that the practice of admitting such evidence will continue unabated. 
The court began by making a fatal mistake that should be familiar by now.  
It conceived that the necessity of the explanatory proof is measured by its 
allowing ―the government . . . to tell a coherent story about its investigation,‖ 
not a coherent story about the defendant‟s commission of the crime.209  Having 
decided to measure materiality by the evidence‘s connection to the 
investigation‘s progress rather than to the elements of the crime, the court was 
forced to conclude that out-of-court statements implicating the defendant will 
typically be admissible non-hearsay evidence to explain why he was 
investigated.  It just so happened that the government in Hinson had already 
introduced another out-of-court statement accusing Hinson that made it 
―perfectly clear‖ why the police focused their investigation on him.  Thus, that 
the detective also heard from another source that Hinson was a drug supplier 
was ―completely unnecessary to explain the police‘s subsequent actions.‖210  
 As if by alchemy, the protective balancing test becomes a per se rule 
guaranteeing admission of ―ample admissible evidence‖ of at least one out-of-
court accusation to show why the police investigated the defendant, even if he 
never claims that he was improperly targeted.  Before embarking on this 
analysis, the Hinson court observed, ―Ascertaining the purpose evidence 
serves, while essential to a determination of whether it constitutes 
inadmissible hearsay or admissible background information, is not an easy 
task.‖211  The difficulty in this case, however, is simply the result of a self-
inflicted wound created when the court, like so many others, confused the 
importance of the story of the investigation with the story of the defendant‘s 
criminality as told through admissible evidence. 
Absent the defendant‘s claim that the police acted improperly, and 
considering that we do not ask jurors to decide whether they did, why is it 
relevant, much less necessary, to show why the police suspected the defendant 
 
207. 585 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. 2009). 
208. Id. at 1336. 
209. Id. (emphasis added). 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
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at a cost to the Sixth Amendment, a cost that courts generally acknowledge?  
If we look to the few courts that have addressed the question, we find this 
explanation: 
The non-hearsay evidentiary function of testimony about 
a police radio call is to provide a ―background‖ explanation 
for the testifying officer‘s actions—that is, to explain what 
the officer was doing at the scene.  The jury need not . . . be 
led to believe that officers responding to a report of criminal 
activity just ―happened by.‖  Neither, however, may the other 
officers relate the contents of that report if the same 
contextual explanation could be adequately conveyed by the 
statement that the officer was responding to ―information 
received.‖212 
But why is it any more misleading to ask the officer in the first instance to 
omit mentioning the radio call than to ask any witness to omit inadmissible 
evidence whose exclusion invariably interrupts the flow of events as they 
unfolded?  In any event, what would be the harm if the jury did imagine that 
the police just ―happened by?‖  Surely that would not adversely affect the 
jury‘s deliberation in any way, much less justify violating the defendant‘s 
confrontation rights.  The only possible harm would be if the jury were to 
conclude that the prosecution engaged in misconduct sufficient to justify an 
acquittal despite finding proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime. 
The likelihood of such an eventuality occurring sub rosa—that is, 
contrary to instruction and without the defendant arguing government 
misconduct and thus justifying admission of the explanatory evidence—is 
exceedingly remote.  Consequently, allowing the jury to think that officers 
just happened upon the scene does nothing to mislead the jury with respect to 
issues before it.  Apart from whether that remote possibility justifies risking 
evidentiary error, it surely does not justify unnecessarily admitting testimonial 
hearsay whose use violates the Confrontation Clause.  Such hearsay should 
not be admitted at all until the defendant challenges the propriety of the 
investigation.  Only then should it be admitted for a limited purpose, requiring 
courts to give a limiting instruction and also to consider whether other 
expedients, such as redaction, better satisfy the need to rebut the defendant‘s 
claims without unduly infringing the defendant‘s confrontation right. 
 
212. United States v. Price, 458 F.3d 202, 208 (3d Cir. 2006).  Of course, if defense counsel 
seeks to exploit the omission of the radio call by saying something on cross-examination such as, ―So 
you just happened by the scene and arrested my client for no reason,‖ he would open the door to 
evidence explaining how the officer came to be there. 
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Thus, admission of testimonial hearsay to justify investigators‘ actions 
should be a violation of the Confrontation Clause, unless the defendant first 
interjects the issue.  Without such a clear constitutional rule, there will be no 
hope of preventing the supposed non-hearsay use of testimonial hearsay from 
undermining Crawford.  That is not to say that every violation will amount to 
reversible error; some errors will undoubtedly be harmless.  But without the 
rule, even well-meaning expedients only serve to perpetuate a practice that 
assures that the Sixth Amendment will be honored in the breach. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Crawford‘s historical analysis of the Confrontation Clause requires that 
testimonial hearsay inadmissible at the Founding be inadmissible today 
without confrontation.  Hearsay, as defined by the common law during the 
Founding era, did not exclude nonassertive conduct as Federal Rule 801 
excludes it today.  Consequently, although defined as non-hearsay by the 
Federal Rules, testimonial, nonassertive conduct is inadmissible without 
confrontation.  To satisfy this requirement with minimal disruption, evidence 
rules should redefine hearsay according to the declarant-centered definition 
that includes all out-of-court statements whose probative value implicates the 
declarant‘s credibility.  Changing the statutory rule will familiarize courts and 
counsel with the definition of hearsay that the Constitution requires them to 
apply when prosecutors offer out-of-court, testimonial statements against 
criminal defendants.  Different jurisdictions can then choose whether to adopt 
a hearsay exception for nonassertive conduct, which will apply to all hearsay 
besides testimonial hearsay offered against criminal defendants. 
To make the expanded confrontation right meaningful for testimonial, 
nonassertive conduct and other testimonial hearsay, courts also need to 
establish a constitutional rule holding that prosecutors cannot offer testimonial 
hearsay for the non-hearsay purpose of explaining or justifying the actions of 
investigators, unless the defendant questions the propriety of the investigation.  
Courts currently allow prosecutors to exploit that rubric by routinely 
admitting testimonial hearsay to explain actions that the defendant has not 
questioned.  By admitting the proof, courts have sanctioned an easy end run 
around the Confrontation Clause that a ―not for the truth of the matter 
asserted‖ limiting instruction does not block.  Courts that admit testimonial 
hearsay, supposedly to justify investigatory steps about whose propriety there 
is no contest, invite juries to misuse the evidence to buttress the prosecution‘s 
case.  Having been told that there is a permissible use for the proof, juries are 
certain to accept the judge‘s unwitting invitation to violate the Confrontation 
Clause by confusing the significance of evidence available to investigators 
and admissible at trial on the issue of the defendant‘s guilt. 
The common law‘s definition of hearsay includes nonassertive conduct 
and prohibits the use of testimonial hearsay to show its effect on investigators, 
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unless it is needed to rebut an express or implied charge of investigative 
impropriety.  Without a firm appreciation for the common law‘s definition of 
hearsay, which includes nonassertive conduct, and for the true use of 
testimonial hearsay for its effect on investigators, which prohibits its use 
entirely unless to rebut a charge of investigative impropriety, Crawford‘s 
mandate will remain unfulfilled. 
 
